

Beyond Doha and Geneva: peacemaking engagement of Afghans and Syrians in North Rhine-Westphalia and Germany

Meininghaus, Esther; Mielke, Katja

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Meininghaus, E., & Mielke, K. (2019). *Beyond Doha and Geneva: peacemaking engagement of Afghans and Syrians in North Rhine-Westphalia and Germany*. (BICC Working Paper, 11/2019). Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-68078-7>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0>

Beyond Doha and Geneva

Peacemaking engagement of Afghans and Syrians in North Rhine-Westphalia and Germany

Esther Meininghaus \ BICC
Katja Mielke \ BICC



SUMMARY

For several decades now, Germany has become home to significant numbers of Afghans, and more recently Syrians, who have fled war. In this *Working Paper*, we analyse the political engagement for peace by Afghans and Syrians in Germany since the beginning of violent conflict in Afghanistan (1978) and Syria (2011). Departing from an understanding of peace processes as more than summits and diplomatic events, we focus on peacemaking initiatives ‘from below’ by Afghans and Syrians in Germany, with a particular emphasis on activities in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), in a long-term perspective. As a guiding research question for this *Paper*, we ask: To what extent have Afghans and Syrians in NRW and other parts of Germany been able to engage in peacemaking, and how are these efforts linked to official talks and the situation inside Afghanistan and Syria?

We argue that the different types of engagement we give evidence of, for instance, rallies, publications, the establishment of associations and even privately initiated dialogue forums for peace, constitute significant building blocks in peace processes. They demonstrate the agency of individuals and groups of Afghan and Syrian background to engage for peace and the potential impact they could have if acknowledged more widely. However, the same individuals and initiatives are usually excluded from official negotiations. In NRW, Königswinter near Bonn hosted the UN-Talks on Afghanistan in 2001, but only few representatives of Afghans in Germany were invited to participate. Similarly, the state of NRW, and Germany as a whole, are home to the highest number of Syrian refugees in Europe, yet hardly any individuals have been part of the Syria negotiations in Geneva.

Our research highlights how history writing and research have sidelined organically emerging initiatives for peace from among societies facing war—including among those living abroad. The evidence in this *Paper*, however, demonstrates that bottom-up engagement of exiles has initiated activities from the grassroots to the highest level, that is comparable to official Track 1 talks that comprise representatives of the major armed factions of a conflict. In conclusion, we argue that such Afghan- and Syrian-led initiatives should receive significantly more scholarly attention and that their consideration will likely change the history writing of war and peace with a much clearer emphasis on the perspective of those who are concerned the most.

CONTENTS

Main findings	5
Introduction	7
From diaspora studies to research on exiles involved in peacemaking: Conceptual approach and methods of field research	9
Methods of field research	12
The history of settlement of Syrians and Afghans in NRW and Germany	13
Afghans: Repeated wars resulted in four generations of immigrants in Germany	13
Syrians: Developments inside Syria and Syrians arriving in Germany	
Spectre of activities and political engagement	18
Afghans: A plural field of contentious actors, interests and means of political engagement	18
Syrians: A struggle for politics	29
Conclusion: A comparison of Afghan and Syrian engagement for peace	39
Acronyms and abbreviations	42
Bibliography	43

Main findings

A focus on peace processes, as opposed to a narrow view on peace summits, allows grasping ups and downs in peacemaking among exile communities and how these reflect the development of the violent conflict in the country of origin in the longer term.

While history writing and media reporting of peace processes show a strong emphasis on official diplomatic summits, organically emerging initiatives for peace from among societies facing war and initiated by individuals in exile have hardly received attention by scholars, politicians and among the wider public.

The analysis of engagement for peace by first-generation Afghans and Syrians in Germany with a special focus on North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) demonstrates the vast spectrum of activities for peace and thus peace-making agency among individuals and exile organisations.

The activities range from personal initiatives to invite the representatives of the main warring parties for dialogue forums, active lobbying of German political parties and members of parliament, regular public protests, publications and outreach to advocacy work addressing the German public and journalists. Nearly all such engagement has been privately funded and is based on voluntary work.

The sidelining of Afghans and Syrians in Germany in official peace processes (although here, both communities are strongest in Europe) resulted not only from the disconnect between official processes and 'initiatives from below' but also reflects existing high degrees of mistrust among members of the Syrian and Afghan community in Germany (and Europe) respectively.

Both groups, Syrians and Afghans in Germany and NRW are not homogeneous but diverse in multiple ways: Political worldview, generation, gender, socio-economic status and class background, etc. The analysis of Afghans' and Syrians' political engagement shows the difficulties to bridge political differences for joint action and to mobilise constituencies for the necessary impact to influence German politicians and foreign policy.

The experiences of political engagement by Afghans and Syrians differ regarding the liberties they are able to enjoy in Germany.

This is despite the fact that Germany provides a context where freedom of movement, expression and assembly are granted in society. While Afghans were able to engage for peace in Germany comparatively free of threats for persecution or blockage for non-return, fear dominates among Syrians. This fear remains strong as the regime and its police state structures remain in place. Since countless instances of intimidation and arrests of those politically active abroad and their families in Syria have been documented, Syrians mostly refrain from open political engagement for change in their country.

Among Afghans and Syrians, there is severe fatigue for political engagement because of continuous war, a lack of support for political initiatives for peace, as well as growing frustration with official peace talks.

The engagement of Afghans over more than four decades shows remarkable perseverance, as it does among Syrians who continue their voluntary engagement despite the current military situation. However, there is an urgent need for structural and financial support which does not seek to introduce foreign models, but which respects enabling Afghans and Syrians in Germany to develop alternative visions for peace which are meaningful to their respective constituencies.

Introduction

This *Working Paper* emerged from our findings that until today, the official history writing and media reporting on “peace processes” almost exclusively captures high-level diplomatic events from the perspective of the United Nations and foreign ministries as they look onto wars and conflicts from the outside. Historical accounts and contemporary analyses, too, sideline the internal perspective of participants from among civil and armed groups (Meininghaus, n.d.), as well as more unofficial processes of peacemaking, especially those to which no external parties are part. This shortcoming applies to most, if not all peace processes that involve official diplomacy, and it is also true for Afghanistan and Syria. As peacemaking, we understand political engagement for peace. We thus understand peacemaking and peace processes as going far beyond “peak events” such as official talks.

This imbalance in reporting has led to a neglect of attention to peacemaking initiatives led by and for Afghans and Syrians not only inside Afghanistan and Syria but also when living abroad.¹ With this in mind, we sought to document this non-official side to the history of peacemaking based on interviews with Afghans and Syrians who have been part of these processes—official and unofficial—as well as those who wished to be part of these but were excluded or decided to keep their distance. As a guiding question for this *Paper*, we ask: To what extent have Afghans and Syrians in NRW and other parts of Germany been able to engage in peacemaking, and how are these efforts linked to official talks and the situation inside Afghanistan and Syria?

Our comparison of the peacemaking engagement among Afghans and Syrians is based on the observation that both communities have a strong presence in NRW and Germany in general. Although the Afghan and Syrian wars show significant differences, many Afghans and Syrians share similar experiences of war, losing their homes and loved ones, having to leave their home country, beginning a new life in Germany and their struggle between frustration and hope. As we show in the following, their histories and

peacemaking initiatives share many commonalities, such as the impact of the Cold War and the dominance of international foreign policy in both inner-Afghan and inner-Syrian politics, but also in their engagement in Germany. In our analysis of their political engagement for peace, we will focus in each case on the first generations of immigrants who left after the outbreak of war, that is the decade after 1978 for Afghanistan and post-2011 for Syria. We chose this focus because we found that political engagement is particularly strong in both cases shortly after the escalation of conflict, which has later been followed by a phase of fatigue.²

Peace processes often fail. Strikingly, in the period between 1946 and 2010, only in less than half of all wars and conflicts, official peace processes were initiated—the other are military victories or unresolved—and in only about a quarter of cases, peace processes ended with a peace agreement (Kreutz, 2010, p. 246). Where they did, still half of these agreements collapsed within the first five years (Convergne, 2016, pp. 144-45). These figures point to severe flaws in existing processes.

In peace processes in the formal sense, it is general diplomatic practice to distinguish three different tracks of negotiations. Track 1 represents the highest diplomatic level, where usually heads of states and foreign ministers seek to negotiate political settlements to wars including for example planned elections or constitutional reform. In parallel, track 2 negotiations typically include civil society representatives and those underrepresented in track 1, that is women, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or religious representatives. Last, track 3 negotiations are those which happen at the local or community level (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2014). Most negotiations are not direct negotiations but mediated by a third party, such as the United Nations. Individuals living abroad are usually expected to be consulted

¹ \ For ease of reading, we speak of Afghans and Syrians throughout the *Paper*. Some individuals may also strongly identify as German. All participants in our research were born in Afghanistan and Syria, respectively.

² \ This *Paper* forms part of a larger research project on war, peace and displacement titled “Between civil war and integration—Refugees and the challenges and opportunities of societal change in North Rhine-Westphalia”. Our analysis emerges out of its fourth module on “Peace negotiations, refugee rights and resources in the Syrian and Afghan peace processes”. The project has been funded by the Ministry of Culture and Research of the State of NRW. The project is independent. Empirical data solely remains with the authors.

and sometimes included in Tracks 2 and 3 (Paffenholz, 2014). Yet, as this *Paper* will show, these attempts at “inclusivity” are neither transparent nor systematic and often ignore peacemaking initiatives undertaken outside the realms of formal talks instead of integrating them.

Our core argument is that so far, peacemaking research and practice have underestimated the grievances and dissatisfaction with the set-up and conduct of official talks among wider populations from countries at war, non-official peace initiatives and also peace process participants. This aspect, we propose, is crucial for understanding and addressing the low incidence of peace agreements and their frequent collapse. We argue that shifting the focus to a perspective from within sheds light on the peace-making initiatives ‘from below’, including among those living abroad. We consider them as crucial because they include individuals and groups excluded from official talks, and because participants in unofficial processes at times possess strong linkages with constituencies inside the country.

For several decades now, Germany has become a home for significant numbers of Afghans, and more recently Syrians, who have fled war. In NRW, Königs-winter near Bonn hosted the UN Talks on Afghanistan in 2001. There, only few individuals who had fled Afghanistan and settled in Germany in earlier years played a prominent role, while most were excluded. Although the state of NRW and Germany as a whole are now home to the highest number of Syrian refugees in Europe, very few Syrians based in Germany took part in the Syria negotiations in Geneva. Therefore, this *Paper* analyses which kind of peacemaking engagement exists within these communities and how it is related to official talks. While it remains of primary importance that Afghans and Syrians who are staying inside Afghanistan and Syria see themselves represented in peacemaking, this *Paper* is dedicated to the involvement of Afghans and Syrians in Germany and NRW to illustrate the significance of initiatives abroad.

We make our argument in four steps: To begin with, we locate our research in the scholarly debate on diaspora/s and outline our methodological approach. We explain why we reject using the term “diaspora” and prefer to refer to individuals and groups instead (Chapter 2). In a second step, we describe how the wars in Afghanistan and Syria evolved historically, and how this is reflected in the presence of Afghans and Syrians in NRW and Germany (Chapter 3). Next, we document and analyse their peacemaking activities, the extent to which they were able to participate in Track 1 official talks (i.e. on the highest diplomatic level) and partially in Track 2 civil society meetings, how the dynamics of their mobilisation interrelate with the situation inside Afghanistan and Syria. The focus is on the first generation of Afghan and Syrian immigrants since the outbreak of armed conflict and war because these are the most politically engaged (i.e. post-1978 and post-2011, respectively) (Chapter 4).³ We offer a comparative synthesis and summarise our findings in the Conclusion.

3 \ The second, third and fourth generations and the dynamics among them, are subject to further analysis and publication (planned).

From diaspora studies to research on exiles involved in peacemaking: Conceptual approach and methods of field research

The dominant academic approach of how populations in exile or abroad have been conceptualised is as diaspora/s. Scholarship on diaspora/s has been highly dynamic over the last two decades and has moved a long way from the initial static perspective of diaspora as homogeneous groups that share a common conflict-related identity through initial displacement, hailing from a real or imagined (Palestine) homeland where diaspora members would long to return to (Cohen & Fischer, 2018). The essentialist flavour in this traditional conceptualisation of diaspora roots in the assumption of homogeneity, a focus on the static groups themselves that seem to constitute dispersed aggregations of victims (Gamlen, 2018, p. 302). Moreover, this reading suggests that diaspora members belong to one 'genuine' culture to which they return to at some point. This claim was substantiated on the one hand by the emphasis on collective myths and memories that would be kept alive about the homeland. On the other, scholarship pointed at a diaspora's troubled relationship with the country of settlement, the concern for the country of origin's well-being (safety, prosperity) and a high extent of intra-group solidarity. From a development and aid perspective, the latter assumption has come to underlie the imperative of funding diaspora organisations by state and non-state development agencies and is also at the core of efforts to establish umbrella organisations that comprise all organised diaspora actors to tap their development potential for objectives such as reconstruction and development of different—as a rule non-political—sectors, for instance in the field of health, education and infrastructure reconstruction in post-conflict countries (cf. Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2019; Kent, 2006).

This said, the academic discussion on diaspora/s has become more differentiated, not least because empirical realities have pointed to other phenomena and given that a postmodern turn has entered discussions in this scholarly field as well. As a result, diaspora studies are increasingly characterised by the trend to acknowledge plurality, phenomena of hybridisation, creolisation and take account of

cosmopolitanism. As a consequence, most of the above mentioned key notions of diaspora have been abandoned which seems to imply that everything fits into diaspora studies (Cohen & Fischer, 2018). There are several valid arguments for abandoning the label diaspora studies altogether, starting from the observation of differences among people with the same country of origin-background. There is ample 'internal' politicisation and contestation of power dynamics as to who speaks for whom and represents whom where; so-called diaspora communities are differentiated by the time of emigration, place of residence, socio-economic status, skills, generation and class among others. In their commitment to the alleged homeland, members of 'diaspora' groups highly differ, some having been engaged at one point intensively, then having withdrawn for some reason or shifted the nature of engagement and the addressees (compatriots in the country of settlement vs./ and war/ peace/ development in the country of origin). Thus, so-called diasporic groups are characterised by a certain element of fluidity. Even the relationships among heterogeneous groups that share one country of origin cannot be grasped by a static pattern but are highly dynamic and change between cooperation, conflict, tolerance, co-existence, occasional subject-based interaction and joint action. It is obvious that this evidence contradicts the idea of an overarching diaspora from one country of origin-context (Fischer, 2018, p. 16). However, as Horst (2013, p. 231) pointed out, "diaspora is such a powerful concept exactly because it ignores internal group differences and functions as rallying call" (see also Dufoix, 2008).

From our perspective, the remaining idea that unites different scholars under the umbrella of diaspora studies still today seems to be the issue of group-constituting common or collective identities. If the plurality and fluidity of such identities are acknowledged, the discussion needs to be broadened to take account of de facto multiple diasporas of one country of origin (because several groups with common identities exist that work for their particular aims independently)—at different points of time or at least against the background of temporal change

(cf. Alonso & Mylonas, 2019, p. 483). Three more considerations challenge the surplus value of calling these groups diaspora. Heterogeneity and plurality become obvious if,

- 1\ the different positionalities (including personal commitments, political viewpoints, interests) of 'diaspora' members are taken seriously.
- 2\ new insights of mobilisation scholarship are acknowledged that highlight how 'diaspora' is not a prerequisite for mobilisation and diasporic action but on the contrary, that 'diaspora' groups are only constituted through mobilisation and are thus situative, ad hoc, particular interest-driven, temporal and figurative.⁴
- 3\ the emphasis on collective or common identities implies that 'diaspora' or even diaspora groups can be treated as collective actors with some overarching agency.

The homogenous viewpoint silences the individual and individual agency. Moreover, it does not do justice to the empirical observation that not all migrants or refugees are part of or will become part of a putative diaspora because respective mobilisation attempts do not resonate, or because mobilisation for a common cause as diaspora does not occur due to individuals' particular positionalities, interests, etc.

Against this background, we do not speak of the Syrians or Afghans in Germany as diaspora or diasporic groups in this *Paper*. In our view, the only valid reason to stick to the label of diaspora would be if the members of the migrant and refugee groups covered here (the different generations with diverse movement trajectories and underlying motives) used the term themselves or if it was popular among them. However, this is not the case. Thus, in the subsequent parts of the *Working Paper* we try to name the groups and individuals (albeit with pseudonyms where necessary, see Methodology) by their own denominations to adhere to the differences they draw themselves (boundary making).⁵ Nevertheless, we regard some of

the conceptual innovations in conventional diaspora studies as analytically productive and employ these for the purpose of our research but insist on avoiding the label diaspora.⁶ Among the new discussion strands in diaspora studies, the following are relevant for our research question on the peace/ conflict agency of exile groups and individuals:

- \ The view of 'diasporas' and refugees as part of the solution vs. only a problem (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Milner, 2011), or peace-makers vs. peace-wreckers, in other words. A related aspect is considering mobilisation as a prerequisite to forming interest coalitions that act/ engage for 'peace' or 'war' (Koinova, 2017). This includes fuelling conflict in the country of origin or among 'diasporic' groups in the country of settlement or working towards reconciliation, peacebuilding, sustainable cordial relations and the end of violent conflict (e.g. mobilisation for ethnic vs civic purposes) (Horst, 2013).
- \ The role of transnational and translocal ties and connectivity, i.e. between countries of origin and countries of settlement, thus taking account of multiple movements and temporal settlements.
- \ The relevance of context/s for analysing 'diaspora' issues (Koinova, 2018, p. 1264), that is the factoring in of spatial, temporal, and relational factors.
- \ The discussion of conflict transportation among different groups from the country of origin to the country of settlement and the other way around (Röing, 2019).
- \ The relationship between 'diaspora' engagement not only with conflict processes here or there but also related to specific state dispositions or challenges origin states and governments might face (Koinova 2018: 1254). This includes the aspect that exile groups and individuals may be somewhat discouraged to en-

4 \ Figurative in the sense of figurations as conceptualised by Norbert Elias (1978), that is normalcy of belonging to multiple figurations at the same time, bound together in each case by respective power differentials.

5 \ For a discussion of Afghans positioning beyond 'diaspora', see Fischer & Dahinden (2018, pp. 295-297).

6 \ Another, not yet mentioned but weighty reason to reject the diaspora label stems also from the recent trend of linking diaspora to the securitisation debate (Feron & Lefort, 2019, p. 35), partly with extensions into prevention of violent extremism and (de)radicalisation debates.

gage with the country of origin because of the conditions there (bad governance, continuing conflict/ violence, level of corruption, etc.).

\ The focus on time junctures and contentious events of 'diaspora' creation in so-called contentious spaces (Feron & Lefort, 2019). There, such groups and subsequent activities evolve through mobilisation processes or, conversely, contention among exile groups forms the nucleus for conflict that not only involves exile groups and individuals.

- \ The focus on the multiple ways that 'diasporas' and conflict co-construct each other (Cohen & Fischer, 2018, p. 4) in light of diverse temporal and spatial dimensions that condition group formation and perpetuation processes. This includes cases where conflicts become resources for 'diaspora' groups, in contrast to the view of 'diasporas' being mere constituents and resources for conflict (Feron & Lefort, 2019, p. 46).

These strands in diaspora studies demonstrate the broad range of the current conceptualisation of exile populations (somewhere and not necessarily settled, but on the move in longer temporal perspective). The prominence of mobilisation approaches in recent scholarship has saved traditional diaspora scholarship from the risk of essentialising groups and identities and being informed by assumptions of primordialism (Sökefeld, 2006). Brubaker (2015, p. 12), for example, suggests to "think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as bounded entity, but as an idiom, a stance, a claim". Feron speaks of diaspora communities as "sites in which processes of conflict or peace take place; i.e. vectors of conflict and conflict resolution at the same time" (2018, p. 15). Nevertheless, the respective stage of conflict might provide for differences in context and thus different repertoires for 'diaspora' agency. Bercovitch (2007) pointed out how different conflict phases relate to a more or less of 'diasporic' engagement for peace. The underlying hypothesis is that each phase of a conflict generates different diasporic behaviour. Accordingly, the way a conflict is ended—the form/ profile of a peace

agreement or the absence of such, or a stalemate, etc.—encourages or discourages exiles' commitment and engagement in the post-conflict order (cf. Baser & Toivanen, 2018, p. 350). Thus, opportunity structures, foreign policies and other political, economic and social factors determine the scope for relations and transactions for peace (Baser & Toivanen, 2018, p. 350).

The emphasis on 'diaspora' as space of conflicts is productive and in this *Paper* includes individuals and exile groups that form to work for conflict resolution and peacemaking. This may occur either among each other or each with their respective relations or non-engagement with like-minded individuals and groups in other settlement contexts or the country of origin. This space manifests in the active ties and relations that result from practical engagement or exchange of some type. In our approach, we capture this phenomenon through the concept of agency, that is the ability to act in dependence of own dispositions and resources. This includes the dispositions and resources of individuals or groups in exile on the one hand and dispositions in the settlement context on the other (whereby both are closely interwoven and mutually dependent). The focus of this *Paper* is solely on the former.

On the question of participation in peace processes, scholarship on "diaspora", "migrant" and "refugee" populations has debated in what ways individuals living abroad can harm (spoil) or strengthen peace processes (cf. Vertovec, 2005). While advocacy and lobbying can be highly influential activities, an impact of exiles' direct participation in peace talks is relatively unknown (Baser & Toivanen 2018, p. 349). In some cases, scholars have argued that diaspora would feed renewed cycles of violence from the outside, for example through remittances (Kaldor, 2012; Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Conversely, Zunzer emphasised for the case of Somalia that diaspora functioned "as a bridge to the international actors supporting the peace process" by providing advice and funding (Zunzer, 2004). Proposing differentiation, Koinova compared the case of Albanian and Lebanese communities abroad to argue that within one alleged "diaspora", individuals might support

radical, but also moderate positions (Koinova, 2011). Comparing the cases of Kurdish and Tamil diaspora in their respective peace processes, Baser and Swain (2008) stressed that it is necessary to consider closely to what extent individuals have actual constituencies inside their home countries to understand their leverage. However, most scholarship on this point often actually focusses on the indirect influence of individuals living abroad (e.g. financially). It hardly considers their relationships with participants in official talks, direct influence or the participation of “diaspora” therein. In contrast to much of the scholarship on organised diaspora and its focus on organisationally institutionalised representations⁷, we aim to refine and extend earlier insights for peacemaking. Our own heuristic interest sets in one step earlier than when an armed conflict ends, namely in the peace-making process and relates the conflict process and the way domestic and international forces/ actors handle the conflict to the exiles’ potential agency to engage in peace(making). Moreover, it focuses on the direct involvement—or attempts of involvement—of individuals or groups of exiles in peace processes. This approach allows us to not only take non-organised and organised groups of exiles into account but also consider individuals’ agency and commitments for peace. We, therefore, focus on actors, agency and concrete measures of explicitly political engagement that aims at conflict transformation in the countries of origin, that is Syria and Afghanistan.⁸

Methods of field research

To operationalise this methodological approach, our research is based on an oral history approach. It relies on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork (including phone interviews) in different regions for this *Paper* in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and Turkey. We have carried out unstructured open-ended life history interviews and semi-structured thematic interviews with research participants who currently are part of official or unofficial peace processes, who used to be part of these but were excluded/left out, or who wanted to participate but remained excluded. For the Syrian case, we have regularly repeated interviews to capture changes in the processes while these are ongoing from the point of view of our research participants. We use our own networks of contacts from the past twelve to fifteen years of working with Syrians/Afghans, snowball sampling and media and archival analysis to approach participants. Media analysis, the grey literature (e.g. NGO reports), archival work and existing scholarship also form the basis of actor mappings (armed and civilian opposition groups) and for triangulating data to the greatest extent possible. Overall, 22 interviews (four with females) have become a part of this *Paper*.⁹ In addition, we invited Afghan and Syrian individuals and representatives of associations for a workshop, which we held at BICC in Bonn in November 2019 to discuss their experiences in peace processes.

Taken together, these approaches allow a critical analysis of diverging narratives and in this manner serve to preserve the history of (attempts of) peace-making understood from an internal perspective. With the analysis, we seek to understand how a careful consideration of networks, resources and a prioritisation of concerns discussed by the negotiating parties—rather than mediators—could help peacemaking gain traction and improve the chances for longer-term peace.

7 \ Among them the EU-funded collaborative research project with BICC-participation (DIASPEACE) that primarily looked at the enabling or constraining factors influencing organised ‘diaspora’ engagement, the types of organisations, their means of operations and how these influenced dynamics of conflict and peace in their countries of origin in the case of the transnational political activities of Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora organisations based in Europe (Warnecke, 2010; Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2008-11).

8 \ It goes without saying that peacemaking understood as political activities is (just) one sphere of engagement Syrians and Afghans are involved in. Van Hear & Cohen (2016) as well as Fischer (2018), for example, distinguish three spheres of transnational engagement, that is between the private, the known community and the ‘imagined’ community, or largely public sphere. These spheres are never mutually exclusive but likely amplify each other.

9 \ The project this *Paper* draws on relies on ethical guidelines specifically developed for this purpose and specified for this module. All data is anonymised.

History of the settlement of Syrians and Afghans in NRW and Germany

Although the history of Afghans and Syrians who have come to NRW and Germany more broadly is often intertwined with war and political persecution, their presence also reflects long-standing bilateral institutional cooperations, for example between Afghan/Syrian and German universities and ministries going back to the 1960s and 1970s. The following section describes the major phases of immigration and underlying conflict dynamics among both Afghans and Syrians historically. It lays the ground for our analysis of how peacemaking efforts have evolved among Afghans and Syrians in Germany in the next chapter.

Afghans: Repeated wars resulted in four generations of immigrants in Germany

Afghans have settled in NRW for a long time. The first more significant number of Afghans who arrived goes back to the establishment of university partnerships between the faculties of economics at the University of Kabul and the University of Cologne and the faculties of natural sciences of Kabul and the University of Bonn in March 1962 (Renesse, 2016, p. 6). A cooperation agreement between the faculties of economics at Bonn, Cologne and Bochum universities followed in August 1966 (Renesse, 2016, p. 7). This collaboration is especially noteworthy because it constituted the basis for mutual contacts and the qualification of Afghan scientists and faculty who were able to teach and conduct research at West-German universities after the start of the violent conflict in Afghanistan, when many could not stay in or return to Kabul. These first generations of students, PhDs and faculty hailed from elite families in Kabul that were well reputed, of more or less traditional influence in Afghan society, and rather well off. Many had been educated at the German-language Amani High School in Kabul, which was a very prominent higher learning institution because of a traditional German-friendly attitude of Afghans.¹⁰

10 \ Rooted in close historical ties from the start of Afghan independence in 1919, the state visit of King Amanullah and his wife in Berlin in 1928; the admiration for German products, quality production standards, but also war strategy, collaboration in the wars; Germany not being a colonial power with respective stakes in Afghanistan such as Great Britain (legacy of three Anglo-Afghan wars), and assistance for

With the so-called April (*Saur*) Revolution in 1978, a coup d'état by Marxist groups which resulted in a turn-around of Afghan domestic and foreign policy, this particular strata of society was dubbed bourgeois and persecuted subsequently. As a reaction to the violent advent to power of the Marxist government, a heterogeneous, countrywide resistance formed that was heavily opposed to the reform programme¹¹ and disparaged it as communist and against Islam. A civil war began in which all critics and opponents were persecuted as enemies of the regime. Those who were able left the country at this point. The first large-scale refugee emigration set in more than one-and-a-half years later after the Soviet military intervention on 26/27 December 1979¹² that resulted in massive violence, for example by carpet-bombing, and high numbers of casualties among the population. In the subsequent decade of Soviet intervention, up to six million people were displaced outside the borders of Afghanistan.

While most refugees stayed in the neighbouring countries Iran and Pakistan, Afghans have since been dispersed throughout the world, with more than 250,000 finding refuge in OECD countries as of 2010 (Centlivres-Demont, 2010, p. 39). Figures about Afghans in West Germany¹³ and NRW mirror this development (Figure 1): While in 1978, only 1,600 Afghans resided in Germany, the number increased almost fourfold to 6,000 in 1980 and 22,000 in 1989, the year of Soviet

Afghanistan after World War II in the ensuing Cold War between the Superpowers United States and Soviet Union.

11 \ The reform agenda included the abolition of the bride price and usury, dis-appropriation and redistribution of 1.2 hectares of land for peasants, literacy and education programmes for the rural population, etc. With this spectrum of activities, traditional and rural elites in particular saw the bases of their power erode and subsequently opposed the reforms violently, using the rhetoric of jihad as an instrument to touch upon the moral bases of the widely conservative rural population and mobilise them against the new regime.

12 \ This is not the place to elaborate on the background of the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan. For an overview of recent research on the motives, course of development and impact of the intervention see Meier & Pentter (2017) and Fenzel (2017).

13 \ The relations between Afghanistan and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were not well developed before 1979; the GDR did not even have an embassy in Kabul until 1978 (Rüttig, 2010, p. 128). Academic exchange started only in 1979 between Kabul and Humboldt University Berlin where up to 50 students took up studies (diploma- and PhD-level, e.g. in medicine) annually in the decade before the reunification of Germany in 1990 (cf. Binder, 1994, p. 20). Besides that, Afghan journalists and military personnel of different ranks were trained in the GDR.

withdrawal. However, within another three years, the number almost doubled to 41,528,¹⁴ and in the decade after Soviet withdrawal, the number more than tripled, thus amounting to 71,955 Afghan citizens in Germany in 1999. However, the communist regime stayed in power. The second refugee generation (1993-95) comprised those who had supported the Najibullah/ communist regimes since 1979, plus ordinary citizens who suffered from the ensuing civil war. A third refugee generation arrived after the onset of the Taliban regime in 1995/96. They consisted of the left-behinds who had arranged their living previously but had now fled from Taliban persecution and violence from Taliban-opposition fighting or diminishing livelihood options under an international embargo and humanitarian emergency, not least due to protracted drought conditions. The continuation of rule by violent means and resistance explains the steady rise in refugee numbers from Afghanistan. A preliminary peak with 71,662 registered Afghan citizens in Germany, thereof 12,272 Afghans in NRW, was reached in 2001, the year that the international military intervention caused the Taliban to retreat and give up state power.

After 2001, a return-friendly climate with somewhat peaceful conditions in Afghanistan was of short duration; actual peace had not been negotiated (see Box 1: UN Talks on Afghanistan). From 2006 onwards, a growing insurgency challenged the rule of the elected, internationally-backed government and its own and foreign military and once again caused larger numbers of people to be displaced. The emigration is tangible in numbers (see Figure 1); while until 2009, the numbers of Afghans in Germany had been decreasing, a reverse trend becomes visible in 2010 and has been continuing since (fourth generation), amplified clearly by the arrival of a disproportionate number of Afghans in the period 2014 to 2016 following rumours of open borders and economic prospects and prosperity in Germany.

After considerable return rates in the early 2000s, those arriving in Germany following the spike of violence in Afghanistan in 2009 were of mixed background. Some had hoped to build their future in Afghanistan after 2001 but had been unable to realise their hopes. The large influx of Afghans from 2014 onwards reflected the desperation, disappointment, lack of perspective but also adventurism to some extent, of largely Afghan youth who took the chance to migrate to Germany in search of a better life. To try to determine mono-causal reasons for their decisions to leave Afghanistan or exile in Iran/ Pakistan would be futile because it is impossible to disentangle socio-economic reasons from factors driving the protracted violent conflict and ongoing displacement crisis in the region. Many of the newly arriving Afghans have only little education or are even illiterate (as is the case with female refugees who were largely deprived of education in the Taliban years 1995/96-2001) and some of whom are of precarious socio-economic and low-status backgrounds. These and others have endured the impact of 30 to 35 years of war in the country or were displaced inside Afghanistan or the neighbouring countries. There is a stark contrast between this later group with the earlier generations that has prompted some of the socially engaged members of the first generations to commit time and resources to working with newly arriving Afghans, for instance offering general guidance, literacy courses and other (integration) support (Daxner & Nicola, 2017, pp. 42-44).

Currently, more than 41,000 Afghan citizens live in NRW, more than the total sum of Afghan refugees in Germany in 1992 (then as result of displacement following a decade-long Soviet intervention and three years continuing anti-government war). In comparison to 2010, when the lowest number of registered Afghan citizens in NRW was recorded (7,823 persons), the population share of Afghans has increased more than five-fold. Nevertheless, overall, it is small when the share among registered foreign citizens in NRW is considered; Afghans constituted 0.44 per cent of all foreigners in NRW in 2010 and 1.6 per cent in 2018.

14 \ Cf. Orywal (1993, pp. 17-18), who indicated that the displacement situation in Afghanistan worsened and led to a 100 per cent increase of immigrants in Germany in the first three years after the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces in 1989.

Figure 1
Numbers of Syrians and Afghans in Germany and NRW

Year	Afghan citizens	Syrian citizens	Afghans in NRW	Syrians in NRW	Foreign citizens in NRW total	Afghan immigrant generations in Germany	Syrian immigrant generations in Germany
1967	733	3,736					1st generation of Syrians in Germany (1967-early 1980s)
1972	1,185	5,849					
1977	1,765	6,481					
1978	1,949	6,750				1st generation of Afghan refugees in Germany	
1980	6,082	8,694					2nd generation of Syrians and first returns
1989	22,461	10,697					
1990	30,585	14,504					
1991	36,409	16,453					
1992	41,528	17,216					
1993	46,464	17,975				2nd generation of Afghans	
1994	51,370	18,310					
1995	58,505	19,055					
1996	63,705	20,523				3rd generation of Afghans	
1997	66,385	21,703					
1998	68,267	22,667					
1999	71,955	24,421					
2000	72,199	25,982					
2001	71,662	27,389	12,272	7,722	1,938,627		
2002	69,016	28,679	11,483	8,086	1,931,494	Return to Afghanistan, decreasing numbers** of Afghan citizens*** in Germany	
2003	65,830	29,476	10,715	8,472	1,015,732		
2004	57,933	27,741	9,414	8,253	1,803,355		
2005	55,111	28,154	9,157	8,683	1,814,379		
2006	52,162	28,099	8,785	8,865	1,814,744		
2007	49,808	28,161	8,660	8,984	1,814,747		
2008	48,437	28,459	8,363	9,176	1,806,201		
2009	48,752	28,921	7,867	9,438	1,789,607		
2010	51,305	30,133	7,823	9,871	1,794,549	4th generation of Afghan refugees in Germany	
2011	56,563	32,878	8,477	10,670	1,825,059		3rd generation of Syrians in Germany
2012	61,763	40,444	9,989	12,717	1,877,987		
2013	66,974	56,901	9,548	16,575	1,963,242		
2014	75,385	118,196	10,812	31,348	2,074,230		
2015	131,454	366,556	18,954	84,261	2,270,248		
2016	253,485	637,845	40,980	174,020	2,512,865		
2017	251,640	698,950	40,190	190,360	2,572,005		
2018	257,110	745,645	41,320	206,240	2,648,645		

* The figures for Afghan and Syrian citizens living in former West Germany and united Germany from 1990 onwards were compiled from the D-Stat website, the ones for Afghan and Syrian citizens in NRW as well as the number of foreign citizens in NRW were generated online from Landesdatenbank NRW.

** Baraulina, Bommes, El-Cherkeh, Daume & Vadean (2007, pp. 10-13) point out that the decrease is related to continued higher levels of naturalisation in the early 2000s and low numbers of new immigrants from Afghanistan.

*** Naturalised Afghans, that is German citizens of Afghan origin, have also returned to Afghanistan in larger numbers after 2001. While some voluntarily gave up German citizenship because they served in government ranks and were legally required to abandon any double citizenship—as in the case of Amin Farhang who was appointed Minister for Reconstruction in the 2001-interim cabinet of Afghanistan under interim-president Hamid Karzai—, others felt the obligation to contribute to reconstruction in their professional or private capacity (in particular members of the first generation of Afghan refugees in Germany).

Syrians: Developments inside Syria and Syrians arriving in Germany

Although Syrians also have a long history in Germany, it is hardly documented. For most, however, it is more recent. As in the case of Afghan experiences, however, their history has been closely tied to internal politics inside Syria. A period of frequent military coups in the 1950s and 1960s first resulted in different military regimes ideologically following the Socialist Ba'th Party in 1963. This included the 30-year regime under Hafiz al-Asad, who through a military coup became president in 1970, followed after his death by the presidency of his son Bashar al-Asad until today. Historically, it was mainly internal repression under these subsequent dictatorships and economic motives that have led to continuous emigration and immigration into Germany.

Among Syrians, we can mainly discern three different periods of immigration: Pre-war immigration (1960s until early 1980s; 1980s until 2011), and immigration since then. While among Afghans who came to Germany at different periods of time, we can discern differences in their educational and socio-economic background for each identified generation, the situation among Syrians has been more heterogeneous. From the beginning of figures recorded in the 1960s, Syrians who came to Germany did so against the backdrop of the dictatorship at home and the regimes' foreign relations to the two Germanies, respectively.

Throughout the time until 1991, that is the collapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification, Syrians from very different backgrounds arrived in Germany. Many did so to continue their higher education in German universities (Council for At-Risk-Academics, 2019, p. 38). Among them were students from poorer and better off backgrounds who maintained close relationships with the regime—partially by conviction, partially out of necessity—and who would study in Russia or East Germany, often on scholarships. Exchanges included military and technical training, such as support for centralised state-building, but also university cooperation and

vocational training (Trentin, 2009, pp. 498–99). It also entailed intelligence collaboration, by which the Stasi (*Staatssicherheitsdienst*, state intelligence) trained Syrian intelligence forces. By 1985, for example, more than 800 Syrians studied in East Germany, and Syrians were also trained in GDR military academies (*Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, 1985, 1987). In contrast, primarily those who came from well-off urban families studied in the West. A degree in the United States, the United Kingdom or West Germany was highly regarded especially in technical subjects (such as engineering), although ideologically, studying in the West was at odds with the regime. Only privileged families could afford such degrees for the children and receive permission for them to leave—and to be permitted to return (Trentin, 2009, pp. 498–99).

A second phase of immigration began in the early 1980s which, at the same time, also saw the emigration of Syrians from Germany. Those especially with medical degrees received higher salaries in Syria—and engineers in the Gulf—than in Germany considering the living expenses. At the same time, a persistent economic crisis inside Syria and the regime's brutal crackdown on political dissidents led others to leave (interview 25 November 2019).

Indeed, political dissidents sought refuge in Germany from early on, and these mirrored that although organised political opposition inside Syria was forbidden and hence very dangerous, a spectrum of political resistance did exist. Dissidents could not flee to East Germany since the equally socialist GDR was a close ally of the Syrian regimes, so West Germany also became home to those who left Syria or who were expelled for political reasons. These included persons identifying with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, who at the time advocated for religion to play a greater role in Syrian politics, for civil rights, and economic liberalisation (Batatu, 1982). The conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the Ba'thist regimes escalated into violent repression and attacks over the 1960s and 1970s (Abd-Allah, 1983; Batatu, 1982). During these years, members of the

Muslim Brotherhood began to come to West Germany following persecution and/or expulsion from Syria (interviews 23 April 2018, 25 November 2019). In 1982, the regime sealed off the town of Hamah entirely for 27 days, where it alleged that members of Muslim Brotherhood were plotting attacks and indiscriminately killed an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 persons. The Muslim Brotherhood was then outlawed in Syria. Thereafter, the regime carried out large-scale arrests and purges targeting alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood and secular dissidents alike (interviews 23 April 2018, 27 June 2018, 25 February 2019).

Equally, individuals who identified with different groups among the secular Leftist opposition came to West Germany during those decades. Paradoxically, this was also true for regime loyalists who came primarily to Bonn as the West German capital at the time to work in the Syrian embassy, as well as traders and professionals (especially medical doctors) from across the whole political and socio-economic spectrum. It can be noted that most Syrians who arrived in Germany before 1991,¹⁵ with the exception of those who came on regime scholarships to East Germany, would have come largely from an urban and highly educated background. Syrians in East Germany were joined by a second generation of immigrants for whom living in East Germany was much more affordable than staying inside Syria, especially during the 1980s and 1990s. By 2010, that is just before the beginning of mass protests, 30,133 Syrians already lived in Germany—9,877 of these in NRW (cf. Figure 1).

For Syrians inside the country of origin as well as those who already lived in Germany, the situation changed drastically when, after more than four decades of brutal dictatorship, Syrians organised and joined protests against the regime in growing numbers from February 2011 onwards, demanding democratic reform, civil rights (freedom of speech, right to assembly), the release of political prisoners, and eventually the president to step down. In the ensuing escalation into war, Syrians began to flee within Syria and across the borders to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan

and Iraq. Today, of a pre-war population of 21 million, 5.6 million Syrians are refugees, and another 6.2 million Syrians had to leave their homes and flee inside Syria to save their lives, many of whom now live in precarious conditions. By December 2018, 770,000 Syrians had requested asylum in Germany since the beginning of the war (Mediendienst Integration, 2019). Within Europe, Germany is hence home to most Syrians (Ragab & Katbeh, 2017, p. 13). Since 2011, those who had arrived in Germany were mainly refugees asking for asylum—although not exclusively because professional immigration continued. The label “refugee”, however, disguises that newly arriving Syrians came from a wide range of backgrounds, including poor families and individuals from remote rural as well as urban areas, farmers, traders, workers, as well as teachers, lawyers, doctors and academics. Politically, those who fled primarily did so out of fear of the regime. Socio-economically, this third generation of Syrian immigrants is the most diverse. Similarly to the Afghan experience, Syrians who had settled in Germany before 2011 rallied forces to provide support to those arriving anew. Among the German federal states, most Syrians now live in NRW (206,240 by late 2018).¹⁶

15 \ Before German reunification in 1990, statistics only listed Syrians in West Germany. From 1990 onwards, statistics included both. This is mirrored by the ‘increase’ by nearly 50 per cent of Syrians in Germany in Figure 1 (from 10,694, 1989, to 14,504, 1990)

16 \ Refugees arriving in Germany cannot freely choose their place of residence, but they are assigned to one of the sixteen federal states according to the “Königsstein key” (cf. Christ, Meininghaus & Röing, 2019).

Spectre of activities and political engagement

The situation in their country of origin played a substantial role for many Afghans and Syrians in their decision to leave home and try to build a new life in Germany. Cold War politics influenced internal politics decisively in both countries, and until now, both countries remain of high interest to external actors often unwanted by Afghans and Syrians themselves. In the following section, we discuss how once in Germany, Afghans and Syrians have begun to engage in individual initiatives and to establish formal associations in an attempt to influence the situation in Afghanistan and Syria, respectively. Our research focuses in particular on extent to which they were able to participate in Track 1 official talks (that is on the highest diplomatic level) and how the dynamics of their mobilisation interrelate with the situation inside Afghanistan and Syria.

Afghans: A plural field of contentious actors, interests and means of political engagement

Quite a lot has been written about conflict and tensions among the different generations of Afghans seeking refuge and settling in Germany (Mogaddedi, 2010; Braakman, 2005, p. 30; Fischer, 2018). Roughly, the superficial impression suggests that the persecutors of the first generation, that is members and followers of the Marxist regimes from 1978 onwards arrived in Germany—after having been persecuted themselves by the Islamist opposition—would have avoided too much contact with the first generation who had fled until 1992.¹⁷ What is generally overlooked is that the first generation of Afghans in Germany and NRW was not at all homogeneous. Rather, it resembled the factionalism that had evolved in urban Afghanistan from the second half of the 1960s onwards.

17 \ Scholarship holders, interns and students who had studied in the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries between 1978 and 1990/91 were also part of the second generation (cf. Centlivres-Demont, 2010, p. 42).

Grassroots mobilisation among Afghans: Political upheavals inside Afghanistan and opposition to the Soviet intervention

Global political influences and international exchanges (Afghans studying abroad; foreigners living, working and travelling in Afghanistan) contributed to the evolution of different leftist and Islamic fundamentalist political movements, groups and parties, from Maoist to Marxist, nationalist-democratic, and Islamists (Pohly, 1992, pp. 116-234). One such hotspot where international influences resonated and were subsequently discussed, selectively adopted or rejected was Kabul University, the place where many Afghans with an educational background from West German universities taught in the 1970s or had started their education in the 1960s. From the late 1960s onwards, Kabul University has been at the centre of political activities and anti-government protests.

Interviewees who had graduated with diplomas or PhDs in Germany and taught at the economic faculty of Kabul University in the 1970s described the political climate as difficult. Highly politicised student groups demanded progressive teaching content in subjects like accounting and finance or banking. Faculty members from Eastern bloc countries felt inferior to Western colleagues regarding the state of their knowledge and their connectivity to international scholarship and research in their respective scientific field (interview 1/2, 30 October 2019). With the Marxist factions' coup d'état in 1978 and the subsequent coup d'état by one of the two constituting factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), some of the German-educated faculty members chose what they called 'passive resistance' to the 'communist'¹⁸ takeover—and left Afghanistan

18 \ The ideological orientation of the two factions (*khalq* and *parcham*) that formed the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was Marxist in nature. Interview interlocutors and a major proportion of the literature labels these factions, the regime and the coup d'état not entirely correct as 'communist'. In this *Paper*, the label 'communist' is attributed to the regime from 27 December 1979 onwards, i.e. beginning with the Soviet military intervention and their installation of Babrak Karmal as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Chairman of the Council of Ministers directly from his previous exile in the Soviet Union. In this position, he introduced intra-party reforms until the end of his chairmanships in 1981. (He remained President of the country and Secretary General of the PDPA until 1986.) Given the prominent role

more or less soon after the coup or did not return to Kabul from their exchange visits during the government reshuffle—or actively resisted for a while. For example, an underground group of faculty who had been educated in West Germany published materials (*shabnama*, literally: night letters) denouncing the communist regime. They understood themselves as liberal and progressive monarchists, had been upset by the regime changes starting in 1973¹⁹ and taken by surprise by the communist takeover that led to the Soviet intervention (interview 2/2, 30 October 2019). As exiles in Germany, they were part of an intellectual group of technocrats that engaged in various political activities to oppose the communist regime, take measures for the formation of an alternative government and contribute to peacemaking in Afghanistan (see Chapter 4).

Other politically active exiles from Afghanistan had joined the left-wing General Union of Afghan Students Abroad (GUAfS), established in 1968 but increasingly fragmented from 1979 onwards. On the opposite side of the spectrum were the representatives, sympathisers, followers and new recruits of the various Islamist factions. Institutionalised by the generous support of Western and allied countries (that supplied money, arms and intelligence, etc.), seven parties had been officially recognised in 1984 to operate from Peshawar in Pakistan against the Soviet-backed Kabul government and the Soviet and Afghan army in a Cold War proxy war (Rubin, 1989, p. 74).²⁰

Soviet advisors and personnel played by their presence in Afghanistan from 27 December 1979 onwards, the shifting label from Marxist to communist is deemed to address this suspected change in ideological underpinnings from a more indigenous Afghan Marxist leaning to the adjustment of predominantly Soviet ideological content.

19 \ Mohammad Daud, previous Minister of the Interior (1949–50) and Prime Minister (1953–63; during this tenure he permitted women to abandon the veil) and initiator of two five-year plans (1956–61, 1962–67) staged a coup against King Zahir Shah (his cousin) in 1973 and proclaimed Afghanistan a republic. His firm line against the emerging Islamist movement created fierce opposition by these and other politically organised Afghans because he created an own party as umbrella to include all existing political movements (Adamec, 2006, p. 256).

Previously, political parties were not allowed by law.

20 \ To what extent Shiite (usually Iranian-backed and not represented in Peshawar/ Pakistan) parties and associations were active in West Germany, Bonn and NRW remains subject to further research. The only publication of Shiite organisations in Germany that was listed in Grevemeyer & Maiwand-Grevemeyer (1988, p. 39) is the newspaper *Saff*, published by the Unity of Islamic Associations of Afghan Students in Heidelberg from 1978 onwards.

Three of these seven parties considered the return to a monarchy or the integration of the ex-king Zahir Shah as symbolic figure of unity in a future government permissible. For that reason, these parties carried the label traditional/ moderate Islamists²¹ while four parties were hard-line Islamic fundamentalists who aimed at establishing an Islamic State (of Afghanistan) based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law (*sharia*).²² Without a permanent representation in Europe or elsewhere abroad, the national democratic forces inside Afghanistan were the main enemies of the Islamist hardliners, followed by other left-leaning parties. Wherever possible, the massively funded Islamists used their influence to fight the national democratic forces (inside Afghanistan) and leftists as first priority and enforce their interests against the traditionalists as second priority.

Despite the fact that that in far exile, the fronts were not as defined as they were inside the country or across the border in Peshawar, Pakistan (the so-called near exile), the political space in West Germany and its capital Bonn in particular provided a platform for what in Afghanistan was considered a “war inside the war”. In Germany, the conflict played out in a competition or rivalry between the various factions of different political orientations.²³ Under the guise of resistance against the communist regime and the Soviet intervention, the different political factions competed in their activities to lobby German political parties, foundations, exiled Afghans and refugees, other Muslim communities in Germany as well as the public to garner support for their particular goals. In this competition, the Islamist parties were the most successful given the dominance of Cold War ideological bias against communism. This political attitude was responsible for the Islamists’ disproportionate access to funding and political offices in Germany (Jahn, 2019). As these fundamentalist Islamic

21 \ Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami (Gailani), Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami (Nabi), Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli (Mojadeddi).

22 \ Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG), Hezb-e Islami of Yunus Khes (HIK), Ittehad-e Islami (Sayyaf), and Jamiat-e Islami (Rabbani).

23 \ On several levels: competition about the interpretation of the causes, process and factions in the conflict, access to German politicians, parties, political foundations, protest spaces, funding, etc.

parties constituted the front against what was perceived as Soviet imperialism in Central Asia, their non-democratic political agenda was ignored and tolerated at best in line with the motto “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”.

In Bonn, the four Islamist parties had one representative each; the three Islamic (moderate) traditionalist parties were represented by one person who was their European representative at the same time, that is in charge of representing the three parties in all European countries. Hezb-e Islami had its own office called “Information Bureau of the Afghan Mujahidin” with an adjacent mosque in Bonn (Theaterstraße). The office name alludes to Hezb-e Islami’s claim for holistic representation of all Afghan mujahidin (liberation fighters) and represents the fact that it was able to dominate the Islamist “resistance” from the mid-1980s onwards due to massive funding.²⁴ Pro-monarchy groups and individuals partly had mutual antipathies; the same was true for technocrats’ attitude towards the role of the former king in a future government. The latter was definitely a point of contention. However, with time passing and the former king himself never showing much enthusiasm to take over state leadership again, the different political factions grew sympathetic to the idea that his role as a symbolic figure of unity would be one of very few productive starting points for a post-war government and peacemaking. Afghans perceived the last ten years of his rule as “Golden years”, a time of peace and a relative liberal political climate based on the Western-inspired 1963/64 constitution (constitutional monarchy).

When considering exile activities from the very beginning until the time of writing, a shift of emphasis from initial highly political engagement and activities to more development and reconstruction-oriented activities and engagement can be discerned. However, importantly, the “non-political” development activists of the 2000s are not entirely the same as those who had previously engaged themselves politically for peace or conflict resolution. To claim this would mean to deny a large number of exiles who had previously been active both individually and collectively the amount of frustration and subsequent withdrawal from public engagement. The sense of frustration is substantial, especially among the “earnest” peacemakers of the 1980s and 1990s; this has caused them to withdraw from the political process entirely. Only very few of the interviewed from this group have taken on active roles in post-2001 Afghanistan. If they did, many experienced frustration in their postings and have subsequently retired. Frustration rooted in the fact that they were not able to apply learned political practices of the West German political system to the realities and processes in the post-2001 Afghan political landscape. To give some examples: Former exile Afghans faced suspicion and prejudices regarding their suitability for the jobs they had been appointed to do (for instance university rectors, ministers, heads of political offices).²⁵ One common offence they were accused of was their exile background, which meant that they had not been fighting inside the country or from immediate/ near exile in Pakistan or Iran. This also implied a certain distance and unfamiliarity with Afghanistan in the eyes of their critics.²⁶ Moreover, tackling corruption inside the offices they had been in charge of deemed a major challenge that left some with the impression that they were fighting against windmills (interview, 16 July 2019).

24 \ Various sources: US and Gulf state financial support channelled via CIA/ Government of Pakistan and Islamic charities to Hezb-e Islami commanders, refugee camps and party-offices in Peshawar. Due to its extremist views and comparatively organised structure that set it apart from the other Islamist parties, HIG (the Hezb-e Islami faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) was chosen to be the main recipient of weapons and funds by the US-allied donors in the Cold War. Noteworthy, in Germany, the Turkish exile community collected and donated large sums of money to HIG, allegedly because Recep Tayyip Erdogan—then a prominent member of the Islamist Welfare Party in Turkey/ Istanbul chapter—enjoyed a close relationship with HIG-leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

25 \ Various interviews, e.g. one phone interview, one in person on 30 October 2019.

26 \ This common prejudice the so-called mujahidin had made central to their political propaganda against other-minded (i.e. anti-Islamist) Afghan exiles residing in Western countries.

Privately initiated political engagement for peace among Afghans in NRW and in Germany

A selective overview of the spectre of predominantly political activities of the first generation of Afghan refugees is displayed in Figure 2. One of the first public protests with more than 100 participants took place in the Bonn Hofgarten on 4 January 1980 to protest against the Soviet military intervention that had occurred ten days earlier on 26/ 27 December 1979 (interview, 16 July 2019). Two groups of Afghans in Germany had rallied their supporters; “Afghans living in Germany” of diverse backgrounds and the General Union of Afghan Students Abroad (GUAfS), each drawing about 350 persons. In the preparation stage of the rally both groups had not been able to agree on a joint protest but marched after one another to the Soviet embassy in Bad Godesberg (interview, 5 November 2019; 700 Demonstranten fordern1980). Nevertheless, Afghans of diverse political background joined in, so did a substantial number of German protestors and onlookers, reportedly including Hans-Dietrich Genscher²⁷ (interview, 19 September 2019). The meetings ended with a joint finale at the *Hofgarten*.

The activities with the greatest impact were the opening of offices by the Mujahidin parties. These served as basis for all activities, i.e. lobbying German political parties and members of parliament, organising visits of party representatives and leaders from Afghanistan in Europe and West Germany²⁸, publishing information material about the particular party’s activities as well as front news and regular news about the situation in Afghanistan to inform its followers (Dari/ Pashto editions) and the German public (German editions). Visits were not only organised from Afghanistan to Germany but also vice versa: HIG-representatives organised for famed journalist Peter Scholl-Latour and a camera team from Germany

to cross into Afghanistan from Pakistan behind the Soviet line and under permanent threat of being discovered.²⁹ HIG enabled a German member of parliament from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to travel to Peshawar and meet mujahidin commanders, Islamist party leaders, for instance Sayyaf, as well as Sibghatullah Mojaddedi after his election as interim President for Afghanistan, in April 1989 (Todenhöfer, 1989, pp. 141-150). KUPFA e.V., with its engagement between humanitarian aid, independent protest actions and political information campaigning³⁰, organised a ‘promotional’ tour for NEFA (National Unity Front of Afghanistan)³¹ in Germany to bring its aims and resistance activities inside Afghanistan to the awareness of the West German government, journalists, church representatives and the wider public (Komitee zur Unterstützung der politischen Flüchtlinge in Afghanistan, 1986, p. 16). On other occasions, GUAfS and Afghan centre-left activists invited people from Afghanistan who represented the opposition inside the country and often worked in the underground in the 1980s, for instance Keshwar Kamal (“Es stimmt, daß..., 1982) of “Revolutionary League”, a women’s organisation for gender equality and social justice.

Lobbying activities of the Islamist parties’ representatives towards lawmakers, political parties and society in West Germany resulted most significantly in two parliamentary resolutions that requested the government to provide humanitarian aid to Afghan

27 \ Genscher was Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time.

28 \ All Islamist leaders paid visits to West Germany in the 1980s, most prominently Hekmatyar, Khales, Rabbani and Nabi. Their successful in accessing high-level German politicians and members of parliament varied. For example, the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, van Well, received Hekmatyar in 1981 (cf. Akten, 1981, pp. 137-141), as did the Ministers of the State of Bavaria and the State of Baden Württemberg.

29 \ Interestingly, Scholl-Latour was given company by his organisers; two Afghan students who studied engineering in Hildesheim and sociology in Straßburg (and in all likelihood interrupted their education to take part in the jihad) served as translators on this trip. See Scholl-Latour (1985 [1983], p. 611) pp. 608-629). The accounts of Scholl-Latour (1985 [1983], p. 611) pp. 608-629) are interesting from another point of view, as he mentions how journalist colleagues in Peshawar had asked him reproachfully why he had chosen the HIG as most extremist Islamic group to report about, thus suggesting that other journalists were aware and rather critical of the HIG agenda as fundamentalist party. On another note, the account describes how HIG pursued a very egoistic political agenda with organising the trip for Scholl-Latour, hoping he and his team would make it to one of their planned great battles and report to the world about it (1985 [1983], p. 611) pp. 608-629).

30 \ In their own activities report, they state that they collected evidence of new Soviet weapons that would be used to target primarily Afghan civilians; they presented this evidence to the press in 1982 (KUPFA, 1986, p. 16).

31 \ NEFA largely represented the resistance inside Afghanistan; its activists were opposed to the Islamist parties and did not go into exile.

Figure 2

Selected political activities of 1st generation Afghans in Germany from the 1980s onwards

Spectrum of activities	1980s	1990s	2000s
Representations/ representatives of Islamists & moderate traditionalist parties	Appointing political representatives for Germany and Europe; establishing party or affiliated offices, e.g. Bureau/ Office of the Afghan Mujahidin in Bonn (1982/83)	Maintenance of offices after 1992: Representation of recognised GoA from 1992-93 presided over by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, succeeded by JI-leader Burhanuddin Rabbani and challenged by Hekmatyar (HIG); Unofficial Taliban Representation based in Frankfurt/ Main from 1996 until 2001 ¹⁾	HIG-representatives with a possibly role in the 2016 peace agreement facilitation of HIG with GoA
Technocrats/ "Monarchists"	Lobbying of German political parties, foundations, and members of parliament until 2001-02 with emphasis on 1980s, as representatives of Mujahidin government (Islamic State of Afghanistan) and from 1993-2001		
	Loya Jirga (Traditional Grand Assembly) initiative of former King Zaher Shah resulted in several rounds of mobilisation of his followers to convene a Loya Jirga with all conflict parties, e.g. activities included lobbying; organisation of conferences in Rome, United States, Bonn, etc.; dispatching of emissaries to Afghanistan's neighbouring countries and Western governments to rally support for Loya Jirga process, e.g. November 1998 conference in Rome, July 1998 conference in Bonn		
	"Peace" conferences/ initiatives in Germany and Afghanistan (e.g. Herat)		Two individuals with an exile background in Germany take part in the UN Talks on Afghanistan (Box 1) 2001 (as members of the Rome Group)
	Annual Afghanistan conference/ meetings in Iserlohn (NRW), since 1984		
Centre-left leaning spectrum of groups ²⁾ and individual actions (nationalist, anti-monarchy)	Different independent actions to attract public attention, e.g. non-violent occupation of Afghan embassy in Bonn/ Ueckesdorf in protest of 1978 Marxist coup d'état on 7 April 1979 (interview, 16 July 2019); Afghan mothers' sit-in/ hunger strike at a Russian orthodox church in Hamburg to protest against the state-visit of Leonid Brezhnev in Bonn in 1981 (interview 16 July 2019), organisation of Afghanistan Tribunals in different German cities ³⁾	regular conferences, e.g. by FAZA (e.g. 1983); Bonn-Conference of Democratic leaders' shura in August 1998 (as reaction to the Taliban's seizure of Mazar-e Sharif), Aachen Conference in 2001	Protest against exclusion of democratic forces at UN Talks on Afghanistan-Conference in Königswinter ("Bonn-Conference") 2001
Selected other politically (un) organised ⁴⁾ Afghans	Humanitarian aid to refugees in the Pakistani camps ⁵⁾ (from the mid-1980s distributed via political camp managers from Peshawar Seven/ Islamist parties), in particular HIG-, HIK-, Etihad-, JI-camps by organisations like VAF (in Afghanistan: Union Aid for Afghan Refugees, UAAR), Help, KU(P)FA in collaboration with German-initiated organisation ⁶⁾ and largely depending on public donations		PDPA, Afghan Mellat, SFA and others protest separately against the exclusion of democratic forces at the UN Talks on Afghanistan in Königswinter ("Bonn-Conference") 2001
	Links with political parties and celebrities and joint organisation of, e.g., Afghanistan festivals ⁷⁾		Peace conference, August 2001 Munich ⁸⁾

¹⁾ After the fall of the communist Najibullah regime in 1992, the mujahidin parties (Peshawar Seven) formed the 'Islamic State of Afghanistan' as outcome of the Peshawar Accord in April 1992. It became the recognised Government of Afghanistan (GoA) throughout the decade until end of 2001 (Petersberg conference, see Box 1). The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, formed in 1996 was not recognised by Germany (only by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and United Arab Emirates).

²⁾ Revolutionary Group of the peoples of Afghanistan (splinter of Shola-ye javed) (Aachen 1974-83), SAMA (Organization for the liberation of the people of Afghanistan), 1979* (Hamburg), FAZA (Federation of Afghans and Afghan Students, splinter of GUAfS that reportedly broke up in 1973/4, i.e. after Mohammad Daud's coup d'état that ousted the King and ended the monarchy, established in Aachen 1979), GUAfS (General Union of Afghan Students Abroad), 1972* in Bonn, with regional (sub)groups in various German cities, Democratic Union for Afghanistan (Aachen).

³⁾ For example, on 11 January 1986 in Hamburg, organised by KUPFA e.V. in collaboration with Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker and Bureau International Afghanistan (Paris). The Tribunal built on presentations of experts on Afghanistan and provided a forum to discuss the findings with members of parliament from all parties. They concluded that the Soviet Union commits genocide in Afghanistan and passed a resolution demanding the West German government and all other states to cut all diplomatic ties with and withdraw international recognition of the PDPA government in Afghanistan. See "Afghanistan Tribunal" (1986).

⁴⁾ HELP e.V. (initiated by German parties in parliament/ *Bundestag*, 1983), Verein für Afghanische Flüchtlinge (VAF e.V.) aka Verein für Afghanistan-förderung (VAF e.V.), Establishment of Islamic Centres of Afghans in different German cities, e.g. Munich, Hamburg, Essen; KUPFA e.V. (12/ 1979*) Hamburg (Committee for the support of political refugees in Afghanistan) aka KUPFA e.V.

⁵⁾ Jahn (2019) points out that German politicians and parliament were aware of the Peshawar Seven's control over refugee camps in Pakistan and that aid to refugees would benefit their fighters.

⁶⁾ For example, with Rupert Neudeck's *Grünhelme* (interview, 30 October 2019), Freundeskreis Afghanistan, or with Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker, Göttingen, in publishing a joint special issue of *pogrom* (the society's journal) and KUPFA's *Afghanistanblätter* or for conducting the Afghanistan-Tribunal in Hamburg on 11 January 1986 ("Afghanistan-Tribunal"). Under the umbrella "Solidarity Committee with Afghanistan in Europe", Bonner Afghanistan Komitee, HELP, GUAfS, FASA e.V., Freundeskreis Afghanistan e.V., F.A.F. Verein für Afghanische Flüchtlinge e.V. collaborated with like-minded international initiatives throughout Europe and the United States.

⁷⁾ KUPFA e.V., for example, 'supported' the Junge Union (JU), the youth branch of the German Christian Democratic Party (CDU), in organising an Afghanistan Festival in Hamburg in June 1985. The organisation's head also persuaded Peter Maffay (a popular German artist) to join their cause of helping Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Maffay gave two charity concerts in Germany and visited refugee camps in Peshawar together with KUPFA-representatives, thus helping to gain more public attention and donations.

⁸⁾ Individual initiative, see below

Source: Own compilation from interviews and partly from secondary literature and archival sources

Note: * Date of foundation (in footnotes)

refugees (1982) and extend aid provision (especially food and medication) to Afghan resistance fighters (1984) (Deutscher Bundestag, 1982, 1984). One of the most successful impacts of campaigning (probably by several Afghan groups, though separately), was the public hearing on 18 and 19 March 1986³² organised by the Foreign Policy Committee of the German *Bundestag* about the situation in Afghanistan.

Islamist parties and left-wing organisations recruited new members in Germany in the 1980s. While the former offensively recruited in reception facilities for Afghan refugees arriving in Germany, the latter did this to a lesser extent but drew followers from organising protests or independent actions and via persuasion with the large number of publications they issued (see Figure 3).

Within this wide range of activities over the years (displayed in Figure 2), followers from across the political spectrum have actively employed public outreach activities—either by editing publications in German, Pashto and Dari or by organising rallies and public protests. The competition between the different factions (war inside the war in Afghanistan, competition about access to political influence in Germany) is particularly evident in these activities and explained further below. However, it seems that occasionally joint activities would happen (not necessarily planned as the spontaneous joining of the leftists' affiliates with the rally of the Islamists on 4 January 1980 showed). One reported example is the annual protest march to the Soviet embassy in Bad Godesberg on 27 December to mark the anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

As concerns competition and rivalries, interviews show that on several occasions, conferences took place in parallel, for instance, the 1998 Rome conference of the pro-Monarchy Afghans (Rome group) and a meeting by a group of people of the so-called Cyprus group, roughly the same date. While the 1998

conference in the Gustav Stresemann-Institute in Bonn was going on, a group critical of this event organised a parallel event in the Gustav Heinemann Haus in Bonn-Tannenbusch. Similarly, protest rallies were staged on the same dates by Afghan groups of different political backgrounds, for example regularly on 28 December in the first half of the 1980s to protest against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and demand the Soviet troops' withdrawal. Also, student groups and left-leaning groups of Afghans protested on several occasions against Islamic extremists, that is the existence and activities of the four radical Islamist parties and those of the so-called three traditional Islamists parties. Intimidation occurred, for example, between representatives of the latter and members of the General Union of Afghan Students Abroad (GUAfS). They even threatened each other and boycotted each other's events. Most prominently, different Afghan activists protested against the UN Talks on Afghanistan outside the gate to the Petersberg venue on the first day of the event on 27 November. They articulated their disagreement with the selection and composition of the four delegations that had been invited to negotiate the formation of the political system in Afghanistan after the ousting of the Taliban. In their view, the delegation members lacked large-scale legitimacy; above all due to the fact that they had been involved in leadership positions in the previous years of violent conflict. That is why they were now not trusted, labelled 'warlords' and deemed unfit to represent the different needs and interests of the Afghan population in the country and abroad.

Besides these public appearances, many of the Afghan groups published their own information brochures from the late 1970s onwards. These prints were produced more or less professionally in the style of newsletters, bulletins, glossy journals, hand-written copies, etc. Before the space for deliberative discourse

32 \ Volker Neumann (1987) claimed that the hearing was initiated by his Social-Democratic Party (SPD). For a transcript of the parliamentary debate on the situation in Afghanistan ("Abgabe einer Erklärung der Bundesregierung Lage in Afghanistan") the next day, 20 March 1986, see Plenarprotokoll 10/ 207, available: <https://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/10/10207.pdf> (pp. 15894-15905). On later occasions, the German parliamentarians debated the situation in Afghanistan in their 125th session on 16 February 1989. See Plenarprotokoll 11/ 125, retrieved from <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/11/11125.pdf#P.9186>.

shifted to websites and Internet fora in the second half of the 1990s, the print issues provided the space for promoting the particular groups' propaganda. The material addressed either the Afghans in Germany or Europe (in this case usually written in either Dari or Pashto) or the German public. In many cases, party offices, organisations, charities and so-called Afghan cultural centres served as editors for these information and public relations materials.

The compilation of materials that were published in and distributed from NRW shows an unexpectedly high number of publications and, respectively, groups that edit and publish these (Figure 3).³³

The mentioned places of publishing give an idea of hotspots of Afghan exiles' activities in North Rhine-Westphalia in the 1970s and 1980s. From the comments section in the Table (Figure 3) it can be gleaned that most publishing was more or less indirectly related to the political upheavals in Afghanistan. It stimulated a tremendous amount of thinking, reflection and the subsequently perceived need to write about it. As a rule, the publications included, among other, press reviews from the German press, interviews (e.g. in refugee camps), reports about visits of like-minded individuals/ public persons from Afghanistan or reports from/ interviews with aid workers (e.g. medical doctors), by correspondents inside Afghanistan who wrote about resistance activities and conducted interviews (e.g. with witnesses of massacres), photos of mujahidin at their front bases, information about events, and not least donation appeals.

Co-existence of formal peace processes and peacemaking from below

Some of these peacemaking initiatives, we will introduce in more detail below, as they highlight a unique kind of peacemaking agency Afghans in Germany have exercised in the past, such as the initiatives around former Prime Minister (1963-65) and

Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Dr Mohammad Yusuf Khan and another initiative by a private person from Munich.

Dr Yusuf Khan had been serving under King Zahir Shah and was the first Afghan prime minister who was not part of the royal family. He had received a PhD in chemistry in West Germany and also held an Ambassador posts in the Soviet Union before taking exile in Germany. In his self-understanding as a technocrat, he worked until his death in 1998 to find a peaceful solution for the Afghan conflict. Among other initiatives for a peace process in Afghanistan, he founded the Organisation for Strengthening of Unity and Struggle for the Liberation of Afghanistan (OSULA) with like-minded Afghans in Switzerland in 1980/81. Given that he had settled in Neuwied (Germany), the centre of OSULA-activities came to be Germany. Due to his charisma and the respect other Afghans had towards him because of his previous role in politics, in particular his ability to moderate reforms towards a modern government system,³⁴ he was able to assemble and unite many active Afghans around him. OSULA was not his only initiative, but the most formalised one, with an office run by volunteers in Bonn. His group attempted to bring the different conflict parties to one table during different points in time. They started their activities as early as the 1980s during the communist Najibullah regime and always aimed at forming a technocratic government. Reportedly, Dr Yusuf saw the need to engage with all sides for talks; for instance, he had also written a letter to Soviet General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev. In the early 1990s, Dr Yusuf and other Afghans in Germany formed the "Afghan Peace Society"³⁵ in an attempt

33 \ For a West Germany-wide overview of the publications see Gre-vemeyer & Maiwand-Grevemeyer (1988). Journals, newspapers and other publications that ceased existence before 1978 are not included in the Table.

34 \ The elaboration and putting into effect of the 1964 'liberal' constitution fell into his tenure. The constitution limited the influence of the royal family, allowed parliamentary elections in 1965 and 1996, guaranteed education and a free press among other issues that were held dear ever after and perceived as legal bases that enabled social and political life in the following 'Golden decade' to thrive. The 1964 constitution served as basis for elaborating the post-2001 constitution, which was adopted by the Constitutional Loya Jirga appointees in January 2004.

35 \ The society was explicitly not founded as organisation or party to allow those who engaged in emergency relief and refugee aid (and for this had to remain 'unpolitical') to join the activities as well. Cf. interview, 30 October 2019.

Figure 3

Newspapers and other publications published by Afghans in NRW until 1988

Publishing place	Organisation	Name and type of periodical	Comment
Bonn	Information office of the Afghan Mujahidin / HIG	<i>Afghan Mudjahid</i>	03/ 1988*, in German
Bonn	Afghan Cultural Centre/ Verein für afghanische Flüchtlingshilfe Bonn	<i>Afghanestan dar a'yneh-ye matbu'at</i> (Afghanistan Press Mirror) (bulletin)	10/ 1987*, in Dari
Bonn	HIG	<i>Haftenameh</i> (weekly) (bulletin/ newspaper)	13th issue by 1987, in Dari/ Pashto
Bonn	Afghan Cultural Centre/ VAF	<i>Kultur</i> (journal)	2nd volume in 1983, in German/ Dari/ Pashto
Bonn	Afghanistan-Zentrum (Afghanistan Centre)	<i>Kultur-Journal</i>	2nd issue in 06/ 1985, German/ Dari/ Pashto, circulation of 1000 copies
Bonn	HIG	<i>Shahed</i> (Witness)	4th issue by 1987, in Dari/ Pashto
Bonn	Afghan Student Union in Bonn	<i>Tondar</i> (Thunder) (newspaper)	Regional issue publication of GUAfS until 1978
Bonn	HIG	<i>Vahdat</i> (Einheit) (nine issues as newspaper, thereafter as journal from 1984)	08/ 1981*, in Turkish
Bonn		<i>Naw Bahar</i> (New Spring) ¹⁾	
Essen	HIK	<i>Al-Hijrat wa al-Jihad</i> (Emigration and Jihad) (newspaper)	5th issue by 1986, in Dari/ Pashto
Essen	Ittehad-sympathisers	<i>Al-Ma'ruf</i> (Famous deed) (newspaper)	8th issue by 12/ 1986, in Dari and Pashto
Köln	HAJAMA	<i>Khabarnameh-ye Reha'i</i> (News bulletin with Reha'i newspaper)	11/ 1986*, in Dari
Köln	HAJAMA	<i>Reha'i</i> (Liberation) (newspaper)	1980*, in Dari
Köln	Sympathisers of the revolutionary movement of Afghanistan/ HAJAMA	<i>Befreiung</i> (Liberation) (newspaper)	12/ 1982*, in German, one edition only
Bochum	GUAfS	<i>Afghanistan Echo</i> (newspaper)	1980-83, seven editions, German
Bochum	GUAfS	<i>GUAfS</i> (newspaper)	04/ 1979, German
München/ Hannover/ Bochum/ Bonn	GUAfS	<i>Bistosewom-e Saur</i> (23. Saur) (newspaper)	1976*, in Dari/ Pashto
Münster/ Bochum/ Hannover	GUAfS	<i>Sparghai</i> (Flame) (journal)	07/ 1972*, in Dari/ Pashto, 17 editions until 1984
Hannover/ Bochum	GUAfS	<i>Rote Flamme</i> (Red Flame) (newspaper)	03/ 1978* (succeeded GUAfS Info)
Heidelberg/ Bochum	Union of Islamic Associations of Afghan Students in Europe (Schiitische Hazara-Organisation) (see Grethemeyer & Maiwand-Grethemeyer, 1988, p. 39).	<i>Saff</i> (March formation) (newspaper)	1978*, in Dari
Aachen	Afghan Student Union (member of GUAfS)	<i>Dritte Aqrah</i> (Third Aqrah) (leaflet paper)	02/ 1979, German
Aachen	Union of Afghan Students in Aachen (member of GUAfS)	<i>Ochqun</i> (Flame) (newspaper)	10 editions until 1979
Wiesbaden/ Bonn	HIG	<i>Al-Sobh</i> (The morning) (newspaper/ journal)	06/ 1981*, in German

¹⁾ Mentioned in interview, 16 July 2019 (not included in Grethemeyer & Maiwand-Grethemeyer, 1988).

Note: The overview is not comprehensive because it does not consider publications after 1988 and the follow-up of the existing ones as of that year. For more information on each of the publications, see Grethemeyer & Maiwand-Grethemeyer (1988). The Table mentions additional publications that the authors learned about in interviews conducted for this *Paper*.

to provide an umbrella format that could enhance mutual understanding of Afghans outside and inside Afghanistan (An interview with..., 1994, p. 8). Thereby, they set great hopes and expectations in the UN process and invited UN-emissaries to their gatherings to exchange views (An interview with..., 1994, p. 9-10). Overall, OSULA backed the Rome Group around Zahir Shah and the King's repetitive calls and attempts to mobilise for a Loya Jirga, first in 1983 (Rubin, 1989, p. 76) and again from 1998 onwards. However, formal activities of OSULA ceased and the organisation itself was largely dissolved after Dr Yusuf's death in March 1998.

While the activities of Dr Yusuf and his followers and friends represent one example of 'organised' civic engagement among Afghans in Germany, this paragraph describes an individual initiative to bring the conflict parties of Afghanistan to one table. Imam Sidigullah Fadai invited representatives of Afghan armed factions, intellectuals, former government officials, members of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, and party representatives for starting an inter-Afghan dialogue to end the war. The event took place at the Islamic Centre Munich from 24 to 26 August 2001, less than three weeks before 11 September 2001. All major factions were represented, including from the Taliban; they were either present in person or joined discussions and addressed participants via telephone loudspeakers at the venue.³⁶ The more than 100 participants in the conference arrived from Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, Europe and the United States. Fadai had been living in Munich for 20 years and throughout maintained relations with Afghan political leaders in European exile. Those present on 26 August 2001, the last day of the conference, compiled the closure declaration³⁷ of the meeting, which comprised 11 articles. Most significantly, among other issues, the participants demanded

- \ that all warring factions fully stop the violence, release prisoners of war and allow humanitarian aid to be delivered (Article 2);

- \ that these factions start talking directly to negotiate for an end of the conflict among themselves, to end the war, without third party mediation, and to form a transitional 'unity' government (Article 3);
- \ for outside powers to stop interfering in Afghanistan and respect the right to self-determination of the Afghan people (Article 4);
- \ for the Afghans in Europe to establish a peace forum for ending the conflict and developing political solutions (Article 5);
- \ that all armed foreigners, paramilitary units and military advisors leave the country as soon as possible (Article 8);
- \ for the United N to abolish the sanction regime and instead impose an arms embargo on all conflict parties in Afghanistan and block supply lines for weapons (Article 11).

The fact that this event took place is astonishing in several respects. First, because the meeting was realised by an individual in quasi-private capacity; second, it took place in parallel to the official UN-process and a largely separate travel diplomacy of Zahir Shah's sympathisers and emissaries in the region around Afghanistan. Third, in achieving a breakthrough to some extent with Pakistan news outlets reporting on the meeting stressing the readiness of Rabbani, leader of the Islamic United Front/ Northern Alliance to enter into a coalition with the Taliban government as one outcome of the meeting.³⁸

The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent political events not only obsoleted all initiatives but—what is more—partially led to the withdrawal of peace seekers in their engagement because of fears that they would be suspected of having links with 'terrorists'. The interview material indicates that Afghans emphasise as much as they can the unpolitical nature of their activities in the post-2001 period. This might have several reasons, such as the existing requirement by donors to be non-political to qualify for funding. However, interviews with later-

36 \ Reportedly, the Taliban Foreign Minister Mutawakil, Northern Alliance leader Rabbani, Sayyaf, Mojaddedi, and Hekmatyar addressed the conference. Interviews, 13 and 16 February 2019; cf. "Afghan factions urged...", 2001; "Grausame Unterdrücker", 2001.

37 \ The press release for the event with a copy of the declaration's eleven points is with the authors.

38 \ In Pakistan, the Frontier Post, Pakistan Observer and The News reported on the Munich meeting on 28 August 2001.

Box 1**The 2001 “UN Talks on Afghanistan” at the Petersberg in Königswinter near Bonn¹ (Track 1)**

Date: 27 November–5 December 2001

Participants: Rome Group (8 delegates plus 3 advisors), Peshawar Group (3 delegates, 2 advisors), Cyprus Group (3 delegates, 2 advisors), Islamic United Front (aka Northern Alliance with 8 delegates and 3 advisors), UN-team of 11 led by Lakhdar Brahimi (Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan), and representatives of 18 countries with observer status at the conference

Organisation: UN office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan

On the one side, the so-called 2001-Bonn Conference on Afghanistan brought together the representatives of the party coalition (Northern Alliance) that had resisted the Taliban in a long stand-off since the second half of the 1990s and by the time of the start of the conference had ousted the Taliban and their political followers from government and other offices of relevance and occupied Kabul with its own forces with the help of the international military intervention. On the other, Afghans from different, predominantly elite, backgrounds who either supported a prominent role for the ex-King (Rome Group) or had taken exile in Pakistan (Peshawar Group) or Iran (Cyprus Group) took part.² The Taliban were not included, invited or even considered to be part of this conference because they were understood as ousted and defeated. A fifth delegation of pro-democratic forces, that is five groups that had also established relations with the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) in Kabul previously, were also not allowed to take part in the conference.³

Proceedings: The agenda of the talks consisted of two major components: (1) measures to determine the path of transition in terms of structure and duration, including the formation of the interim administration and plans for a so-called Emergency Loya Jirga, and (2) security measures to end violent conflict and ensure security for the population. With strong US-pressure, the delegates agreed on Hamid Karzai (affiliated with the Rome Group but absent from the conference) to become interim head of state⁴ of Afghanistan until the Emergency Loya Jirga in 18 months’ time would determine the official administration. The Rome Group was made up of Afghans who lived in Germany, for example Mir Mohammed Amin Farhang, Professor of Economics at Bochum University, who was appointed Minister for Reconstruction in the interim cabinet.

Result: Cabinet posts agreed upon in the meeting were distributed as follows: 17 for the Islamic United Front, nine for the Rome Group and four for the Peshawar Group. The Cyprus Group refused to accept cabinet posts at this stage.⁵

1 \ The official website of the conference includes detailed further information, see: <https://www.unric.org/de/frieden-und-sicherheit/26328> [accessed 18 November 2019].

2 \ The designation of two groups of delegates as Peshawar Group and Cyprus Group is misleading given that – just as the Rome Group and the Northern Alliance – they are not homogeneous. However, there is reason to assume that both groups have more or less been artificially created – with influence by the UN – to create the impression that Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries and the refugee population therein are being represented indirectly. Cf. interviews, 5 June and 5 August 2019. Francesc Vendrell, the Personal Representative of Lakhdar Brahimi (SRSG) and head of UNAMA had held intensive talks in Kabul in the two weeks preceding the conference and agreed on the format of four delegations taking part. However, the choice of the delegates was reportedly to be decided within the delegations. As Ahmad Fawzi, Spokesman for the SRSG for Afghanistan, said in a press conference at Königswinter on 25 November 2001, “... the UN is not imposing any choices on the Afghan parties. The choice of the delegates is entirely up to them. We are not asking them to send one or the other. We are asking them to send groups that are representative and that can take decisions.” See “Press Briefing by...”, 25 November 2001, p. 3. Retrieved from <https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/agenda.pdf> and <https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/pb25nov.pdf>

3 \ According to Thomas Ruttig, then political officer of UNAMA and personal aid of Francesc Vendrell, the groups had been officially invited but in last minute denied access as regular participants and were merely granted observer status (Ruttig 2006, p. 16). For an overview of the groups, see Ruttig, 2006, pp. 16–17).

4 \ Although not in the agenda and to largely everybody’s surprise, Karzai addressed the participants and diplomatic observers at the opening of the conference via phone from southern Afghanistan during the public opening ceremony when German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the international press were present. See the agenda here: <https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/agenda.pdf> and published content of Karzai’s statement with quotes for press available at <https://www.unric.org/html/german/afghanistan/talks/karzai.pdf>

5 \ After the conference, one member of the Cyprus delegation was assigned to a cabinet post. Delegates who took part as members of the Peshawar Group maintained three posts.

Box 2***Afghan civil society meeting in Bad Honnef (Track 2)*¹**

Date: 29 November-2 December 2001

Participants: except for three people, all Afghan participants came from abroad, i.e. Pakistan (48), Iran (5), Europe/ United States (13) and Dubai (10 traders) (in total 31 female and 45 male); selection process of the participants was ad hoc, days before the meeting began.

Organisation: swisspeace and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Proceedings: Civil society actors chose topics for discussion in six working groups on education, reconstruction, human rights, constitution, security, and women's issues. According to the organisers' final report on the civil society meeting (see Schmeidl, 2002)², the civil society actors had expressed more than once that they "did not see the actors on Petersberg as legitimate. They were only there due to holding power through weapons and territory, but not because they were wanted" (p. 3).

Linking Track 1 and 2: After the group was visited by Lakhdar Brahimi and Zalmay Khalilzad early on, when discussion had not really begun, a civil society delegation was formed from among the participants and received at the UN Talks on Afghanistan, however reportedly only by third-tier members of the delegation in the 'political' conference.

Result: The Bad Honnef participants interacted with the political actors at the Petersberg, and the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development and members of parliament from the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The meeting was deemed to have jump-started 'civil society involvement in the Afghan peace and reconstruction process' and carried a high symbolic value. Its work focused on four main activities. Besides networking, coordination and information exchange, the most important activities were to link civil society with the official peace process, that is to establish a durable link between Track 2 (civil society) and Track 1 (diplomatic and reconstruction efforts by state actors).

1 \ cf. Reber & Schmeidl (2002).

2 \ Internal report; used with the permission of swisspeace.

generations Afghans, in particular youth, showed that young Afghans in North Rhine-Westphalia felt highly stigmatised and perceived as suspects and 'terrorists' in the aftermath of 9-11. This led them to mobilise to raise awareness about political differences (interviews, 15 March 2019, 28 October 2019). In the aftermath of 9-11, two major 'peace' events concerning Afghanistan took place in NRW.

Accordingly, at a closer look, the UN Talks on Afghanistan were no peace negotiations as such, and Afghans living in Germany did not initiate them nor did they have a particular share in either event in contrast to Afghans from other exile countries in the far and near abroad (assembled in the so-called Cyprus- and Peshawar delegations). In the UN-organised, politically US-dominated and Germany-hosted Petersberg conference (Box 1) of 28 November to 5 December 2001, only two Afghans who lived in NRW³⁹ at the time made it into the four delegations of participants.

39 \ Another two participants had graduated from Bochum and Köln University with a PhD degree at an earlier point in time.

It is important to mention that several protests were held by Afghan political groups and movements that were not included in the UN Talks and neither in the Track-2 event (see below). The protestors criticised the selection of participants at the UN-event, that is the exclusion of democratic forces and the inclusion of mujahidin commanders whom they blamed for their earlier engagement in the civil war and the inability to form a government after the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan (see Figure 2).

Parallel to the UN Track 1-talks, a Track 2-event was organised as a shorter but complementary Afghan Civil Society Meeting (Box 2) from 29 November to 2 December 2001. Here, Afghans from the near abroad, i.e. Pakistan, Iran and Dubai, were in the majority. The meeting served as a platform from where swisspeace established the Afghan Civil Society Forum from 2002 onwards.

In sum, this section shows the difference between formal processes and initiatives launched by private persons.

Syrians: A struggle for politics

Grassroots mobilisation: Opposition politics inside and outside of Syria

Unlike in Afghanistan, where diverse political groups established themselves in the underground between 1964 and 1978, this was not the case in Syria before 2011. Especially before the war, any form of political engagement outside the Ba'th party primarily meant to face an existential threat to a person's life and the well-being of their family. Extensive surveillance among the general population has been on a scale comparable to the former German Democratic Republic, including monitoring of phone calls, the mail, and in later years the Internet, as well as through a wide network of informants. Syria could be a good place to live—but only if one endorsed state propaganda and performed the rituals thereof as required, staying clear of voicing criticism, let alone engaging in oppositional politics (Wedeen, 2015; Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). Almost all intellectuals, human rights lawyers and politically engaged individuals who sought to develop alternative visions of democratic reform, civil rights, minority rights and a more independent judiciary before the war spent years and often decades of their lives in prison. This includes the full spectrum of politics from Communists to the Muslim Brotherhood—whether they were actual members or accused thereof.⁴⁰ Trials against “dissidents” in Syria are largely held behind closed doors, (often false) forced confessions are obtained through torture. The rule of law does not exist. From children to adults, many Syrians have grown up to fear the state, its officials, and the *mukhabarat* (intelligence). In Syria as in Germany, political engagement outside regime ‘politics’ was hence rare and has been characterised by a sense of extreme danger and fear.

Since 1963, Syria has de facto been a one-party state, and political parties had been outlawed before several times already. When in that year, a group of military officers came to power in a military coup and declared the regime to be Ba'thist, the Ba'th party

counted barely a few hundred members among a population of five million. Overall, political parties with greater following in Syria had only just begun to emerge, but parliament was abolished. When it was reintroduced formally in 1972 under Hafiz al-Asad, parliament factually exercised no power and only functioned to approve of laws initiated by the president (Perthes, 1995; George, 2003). The number of seats in parliament were fixed, and the Ba'th held more than the absolute majority, so that elections, which were openly controlled by security forces, would only serve to fill the seats. Among the political parties permitted in the so-called National Progressive Front were the Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Movement (today: National Covenant Party), the Arab Socialist Union and the Socialist Unionists (Seale, 1990, pp. 175-76).⁴¹ The Muslim Brotherhood was banned in 1963, and due to its continued attempts at organising resistance, including assassinations and armed attacks against Ba'thist officials and military forces, it was outlawed in 1980. After Hama (1982), it has largely ceased activities inside Syria. Political engagement outside the Ba'th and the larger Front parties primarily meant to face persecution. For two generations of Syrians, “elections” mean having to cast their vote under the eyes and in the presence of intelligence personnel facing the threat of beatings for a “wrong” vote, and not having experienced freedom of assembly. Even establishing a non-political civil society association has required ministerial and intelligence approval, triggered extensive surveillance of all persons involved and their families and friends, and thus remained very limited. In theory, a number of other political parties have continued to exist; however, where these actually worked on political programmes, their members have repeatedly faced arrest, while other parties have merely existed on paper.

Despite grave risks, an internal opposition continued to exist over the decades before the war, but it remained limited to very small circles mainly based in some of the cities (Lund, 2012). After Bashar al-Asad came to power in 2000, a brief period of alleged openness towards “reform” by the regime initially led to

40 \ With law no. 49 in 1980, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital crime punishable by death (George, 2003, p. 92).

41 \ These were expanded in 2005 by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

hopes for more leeway, which were quickly disappointed. Most signatories of the Declaration of the 1000, a statement which became a rallying point for those advocating for political reform during the so-called Damascus Spring in 2001, were threatened and imprisoned shortly thereafter. Four years later, the Damascus Declaration signalled an attempted to create a longer-lasting umbrella group for political engagement outside the Front. The regime kept a close watch on its signatories, and many faced arrest and imprisonment.

If among Afghans, the situation inside Afghanistan was mirrored by their engagement in Germany, so did the situation of Syrians in Germany reflect the highly repressive dictatorship inside Syria and its oppression of any form of oppositional politics. For Syrians who left the country during these years for professional reasons, engagement in oppositional politics was no option even when living abroad because they were aware of the reach of the regime. Many maintained the relationship with their wider family inside Syria, where the police state meant surveillance of phone calls and letters, especially for those with connections abroad (Ismail, 2018). Engaging in oppositional activities would have put their remaining family inside Syria at risk of intimidation and interrogation or worse by the mukhabarat, and they would have forfeited their possibility to return. While Syrians who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and who had fled the country or were expelled did come to Germany with an alternative political vision, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria itself ceased to work in 1982. Leftists who lived abroad often also maintained close contact among each other, but generally they would not advocate for alternative politics openly because hardly anyone could have afforded to openly voice their support. For these reasons, Syrian oppositional politics were a non-subject for most inside Syria pre-2011, and also for many of those who lived in Germany.

Privately-initiated political engagement for peace among Syrians in NRW and Germany

In line with these developments, political engagement for peace among Syrians in Germany mainly began around 2011. Inside Syria, political rallies, now often including the younger generation, required protesters to organise while the military was deployed across the country. Mass arrests began, and security forces attempted to crush protests (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013; Amnesty International, 2016). Political self-organisation did emerge after decades of inertia and silence (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016; Abboud, 2016). In many places, civilian local coordination committees (LCCs) were formed to organise protests. They created social media networks, passed on reports and blogs also to the international media, while others formed armed groups on the regime and the opposition side, initially often as neighbourhood watches. With the war deepening, LCCs often took over the task of distributing humanitarian aid in opposition-controlled areas and taking on administrative responsibilities for services, repairs and other tasks previously carried out by government bodies. The increasing militarisation of the war and the rise of Islamist groups from 2014 onwards, as well as the Russian military intervention in support of the regime in autumn 2015, however, led to a severe decrease of the space for emerging oppositional politics (Saleh, 2017; Khoury, 2013). The opposition lost ground militarily against the Russia-supported regime (including the Russian Air Force), Iranian troops (Revolutionary Guards), and fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah. Although the armed opposition has received support in weapons, ammunition and the payment of salaries primarily by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, this never included aerial support, and especially the halt of US-support in 2018 led to territorial losses except for the governorate of Idlib and the Kurdish north. The UN Security Council has remained blocked for international intervention against the regime and its allies, which for now seems to render the prospects of political change slim at least in the short-term. After

many had hoped that war atrocities would be followed by justice and political change might be a real possibility due to significant gains until 2015, when Russia entered the war, many research participants now describe deep-seated disappointment, feelings of loss and severe fatigue.

The engagement of Syrians in Germany partly mirrors these experiences, but in parts, it also differs significantly. In principle, the most distinctive characteristic is that even among Syrians in Germany, throughout the war, the fear of persecution, for loved ones inside Syria and the fear to not be able to return has continued to reverberate. First, this is reflected in the fact that most newly founded associations among Syrians since 2011 are humanitarian (collecting winter clothes, supporting hospitals inside Syria, etc.), developmental (supporting education initiatives inside Syria, etc.), or aim to support newly arriving Syrian refugees in Germany and provide help in their daily life here. Most associations focused on humanitarian, development and integration initiatives, while only few have worked on advocacy and political topics (Ragab & Katbeh, 2017, p. 20).

According to research participants in Germany, from 2011 onwards, mainly those who identified with the opposition began organising protests and speaking to the media to raise awareness of the developing crisis. Compared to the growing number of Syrians who had arrived in Germany, participation in political rallies remained low and this largely out of persistent fear. However, private organisers, among them Syrians, German intellectuals and others, as well as associations did organise protests that brought together between about 100 and up to several thousand protesters in many cities across Germany. Protests have taken place primarily as a plea for awareness and support during times of major regime offensives, such as the assault by Syrian, Russian and allied Iranian and Hezbollah forces on Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city that had largely been under opposition control since 2012, in December 2016. The United Nations later condemned the offensive for war crimes committed, including the use of chemical weapons, deliberate attacks on civilians and humanitarian relief workers

and medical sites (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). The Turkish invasions and offensives in north-western Syria in December 2018 (Afrin) and the north-east since October 2019 have also prompted large protests in different cities in Germany. In both cases, the Turkish military has deemed the Kurdish YPG (Yekineyen Parastina Gel, People's Protection Units), which in an alliance with Arab fighters from the area form the Syrian Democratic Forces that controlled one-third of Syrian territory until November 2019, a terrorist organisation due to its alleged links with the Turkey-based PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers' Party). Furthermore, the association Families for Freedom e.V. has organised political rallies in Berlin, among other places, to raise awareness of the dire situation of an estimated 98,000 Syrians who, after having been arrested "have been forcibly disappeared" in Syria since March 2011 (Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2019). Since their arrests, their whereabouts have not been known to their families; authorities refuse to disclose their whereabouts, and many have since been murdered (Amnesty International, 2015, 2016).

These rallies are significant in that they achieved to mobilise Syrians in Germany to continue to raise public awareness of the war, which is now in its eighth year, and help to maintain a feeling of solidarity and mutual support. While these represent grassroots initiatives calling for peace, they are not formally aligned with any political group or official peace processes. This connection is more immediate for the Berlin-based association Families for Freedom, founded by a number of Syrian mothers, sisters and wives whose loved ones have been disappeared. They have created the so-called Freedom Bus: A two-level red bus with 100 picture frames of disappeared persons that serves as a monument, and around which their protests are organised—also elsewhere in Europe. Over several years, Families for Freedom petitioned for the Special Envoys in the UN-led Geneva peace process to include the release of detainees and clarifying the fate of those who "have been disappeared" into the agendas of negotiating rounds (interview 25 February 2019). Until Geir Pederson assumed office

as the Special UN Envoy for Syria in early 2019, this plea was continuously rejected. It has since then received greater public attention, however, neither the United Nations nor the official, internationally recognised opposition body, the Syrian Negotiation Commission (see below), possess the means to pressurise the regime into concessions.

Syrians have more rarely also founded associations which are outspokenly political or offer platforms for political discussions among Syrians. The earliest such initiatives in Germany began in 2013, but in fact, many only orientated their work towards Syrians in Germany after working with partners inside Syria became increasingly difficult, and hopes for regime change became scarce around 2016 (especially with the regime recapturing Aleppo, and subsequently the Syrian south). The aim of these initiatives, many of which actually continue to also work inside Syria where possible, is to support Syrians in participating in German politics, to enable discussions about what an alternative future for Syria may look like, and to learn about different forms of political systems and civic participation after having come from a regime where political education was restricted to state propaganda and critical thinking was not permitted.

Unlike Afghan activities, these initiatives are by and large not launched by persons of first-generation immigrants with a long history of peacemaking engagement but by younger women and men. Indeed, research participants stressed that the identified three generations of Syrians have hardly connected. Before 2011, Syrians in Germany who did join some form of groups were part of the so-called *Freundschaftskreise* (circles of friends), which existed in most cities, but most of which did not reach out to others after 2011. The Bonn group, based around the former Syrian embassy from the times when Bonn was the German capital (until 1990) is still known as pro-regime (interview, 15 November 2019). Some members of these *Freundschaftskreise* later founded humanitarian organisations, for instance, which formally should be politically neutral. Yet in reality this is not the case: Some groups would deliver aid into regime-controlled areas, whereas others focused on areas controlled by

the opposition. Although many of these associations joined the Dachverband Deutsch-Syrischer Hilfsvereine e.V. (umbrella organisation for German-Syrian aid associations) founded in 2013 as a coordinating body, underlying political disagreements have hindered the Dachverband from condemning attacks inside Syria publicly, for instance. Among those who arrived from 2011 onwards, it has mainly been young women and men who founded more politically orientated associations. For the initial years, research participants describe a greater sense of mutual help among those who newly arrived, which over time, however, has been noted to have faded. Among associations, which receive little financial support especially for political work among Syrians inside Germany, this is partially seen as a result of a newly emerging “business mentality”—the need for initiatives to survive and attract funding. Many activists assumed full-time studies and jobs, thus were facing time constraints as well as the additional problem of persistent mistrust and fear among Syrians. There is also a sense of betrayal stemming from the older generation’s silence. One research participant brought to the point a sense that was shared in several interviews when noting that “while the early generation of Syrians in Germany did not hinder us in our engagement and in our revolution, they failed to support us”. Representatives of the earlier generation with a history of resistance stated that they withheld their support out of hopelessness and disillusionment; in one case, somebody who had formerly identified with the Muslim Brotherhood told another research participant that “our revolution already ended 30 years ago” (interview, 7 November 2019). Equally, there is a strong sense that circumstances have changed, and many research participants stressed that the demands and achievements post-2011 differ from those of the 1980s especially in the country-wide scale of protests, which have mobilised Syrians from all age groups and backgrounds.

Syrians quickly became very active in organising hands-on support inside Syria, by organising protests, liaising with international media, documenting violations, replacing state government structures in areas which came under the control of oppositional forces

Figure 4*List of rallies on Syria in Germany (selected)*

Date	Event	City	Participants
18.06.2012	Demonstrations against pro-Assad protesters	Hamburg	100 pro-Assad; 200 against
02.11.2014	Demonstrations on World Resistance Day for Rojava	e.g. Berlin (worldwide)	
27.02.2016	Demonstration against attacks in Kurdish Northern Syria and attacks against journalists	Bonn	200
01.10.2016	Protest against the attacks against East Aleppo	Berlin	
01.10.2016	Demonstration against the Syrian Army offensive and the Russian Airforce on Aleppo	Münster	150
05.11.2016	Demonstrations on World Resistance Day for Rojava	e.g. Hamburg	
05.12.2016	Demonstration against attacks on Aleppo in front of the Russian Embassy	Berlin	
07.12.2016	Demonstration against attacks on Aleppo in front of the Russian Embassy	Berlin	300
14.12.2016	Demonstration against the Syrian war, Assad and indifference	Aachen	100
17.12.2016	Demonstration to protect civilians in Aleppo, and against the Syrian regime and Russian offensives	Stuttgart, Berlin, Mannheim, Hamburg	2000 each (Stuttgart, Berlin), 800 (Hamburg)
19.12.2016	Freiheit für Aleppo	Siegen	100
08.01.2017	For peace in Syria	Aachen	
02.02.2017	For peace in Syria	Wuppertal	
18.03.2017	For freedom and human rights in Syria	Köln	
25.01.2018	Demonstration of Kurds against Turkish offensive on Afrin, North West Syria	Bonn, in front of the UN	
17.03.2018	Demonstration of Kurds against Turkish offensive on Afrin, North West Syria	Hannover, Hamburg, Cologne and Wuppertal	11,000
14.04.2018	Anti-war coalition: Demonstration against US, UK and French airstrikes on Syrian military base	Frankfurt am Main	
15.04.2018	Anti-war coalition: Human chain to demonstrate against US, UK and French airstrikes on Syrian military base	Aachen	100
15.03.2019	Demonstration on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the revolution	Berlin	500
18.10.2019	Demonstration against the Turkish invasion in North East Syria	Cologne	10,000
20.10.2019	Demonstration against the Turkish invasion in North East Syria	Frankfurt	4500

Source: Own compilation

and initiating a lively civil society which had previously been unthinkable. Yet amid the continuous pressure of war and after decades of repression, what has not emerged are groups or parties with actual political programmes, which could be appealing to a wide range of Syrians, and which could run for elections and actual state reform from within. In Germany, few newly founded associations have tried to slowly begin filling this gap, as they regard an open and honest exchange of political views, civic and political education as the first step towards longer-term alternatives to the current regime.

Among the associations founded since 2011, Adopt a Revolution e.V. was established by Syrians and Germans initially to support numerous projects inside Syria—including support to LCCs. In more recent years, Adopt a Revolution have also worked with Syrians in Germany, often those who had previously been active inside Syria. For example, in the project “Talking about the Revolution”, Syrians travel across Germany to speak to the interested public—be they political parties, church groups, or adult education centres—about the Syrian war to create awareness of their history and experiences. This project offers training for participants in storytelling, and it brings together activists from different places in Germany to meet and connect. Addressing younger participants, “Visions-4Syria” is a youth camp which Adopt a Revolution ran in 2018 to facilitate discussions about how Syrian refugees could participate in Germany politically, and how they envisage a future in Syria. Furthermore, their project “Repression, Opposition, Revolution—DDR and Syria” brings together Syrians and former dissidents of former East Germany based on their shared experience of fighting dictatorship. Together, they travel to those areas in Germany with a strong right-wing AfD⁴² presence to discuss their mutual experiences in the struggle against authoritarianism and nationalism (interview, 25 November 2019).

Equally based in Berlin, Impact e.V. is a Syrian association which focusses on civil society research and development. Similarly to Adopt a Revolution, it originally worked primarily with partners inside Syria, and more recently also supports Syrians in Germany.

Among their political engagement activities, Impact brought together Syrian activists in March 2017. Also, their project MPs2030 aims to provide political education through workshops to young Syrians in Germany (18-30 years on federalism, political parties, etc.). Their aim is to enable young Syrians to become more politically active in Germany, and ideally to enable them to run for parliamentary elections by 2030. Founded in 2013 by Syrians and Germans, Hiwarat e.V. (formerly: Friedenskreis Syrien e.V) has equally launched several projects supporting dialogue among Syrians in Germany to enable political discussions and an alternative vision for peace in the longer-term future also inside Syria. One project is a regular round table on transitional justice, diversity, and feelings of powerlessness regarding the situation in the country. “Peace between here and there” was a project based in Berlin where Syrian women met to discuss their experiences of having to flee from home, of violence and hope, which often remain silenced. To help voice their fears and hopes and to enable exchange with non-Syrians in Berlin, participants in this project together with the Syrian writer and artist Kefah Ali Deeb put their experiences into words and stories in writing workshops. Later, the authors read their stories in public readings. Another population group which the initiators of the Hiwarat e.V. identified in need of support to become more socially and politically integrated and active are persons above the age of 40. For these, the Hiwarat e.V. is currently running a project “Engagement for all age groups”, where participants can choose which topics they would like to engage in more (e.g. experiences of discrimination and alienation in Germany, active participation). For each session, a participant prepares an introductory talk, which is then opened for discussion; at times, also external presenters can be invited (interview, 8 November 2019). Furthermore, “Young Leaders for Syria” is a project that was founded by the Syrian association Citizen Diplomats for Syria e.V., a group of former Syrian diplomats who deserted from diplomatic service, as well as Hiwarat e.V. and The European Foundation for Democracy. Its aim is to support reconstruction in Syria through exile communities.

42 \ “Alternative for Germany”; right-wing populist political party.

Similarly, the Democratic Society Center e.V. founded in Aachen in 2019 has organised for Syrian students to visit the parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia. In this manner, its initiators hope to enable Syrian students to learn more about their civil rights in Germany, about the German political system, and to enable a personal exchange with parliamentarians (interview, 15 November 2019).

All of these initiatives are mainly run by young Syrians who arrived in Germany after 2011, and who believe that any remaining hopes for change and an alternative to the persistent dictatorship requires a long-term approach to enabling political dialogue and participation among Syrians abroad where this is possible. For their founders, encouraging Syrians to join these initiatives has often proven difficult. Many research participants state that even after having left Syria, many Syrians feel cautious and try to keep their distance from Syrians outside their own initiative and family. Indeed, continuous resistance and war have not meant that the threat by the Syrian security apparatus even for Syrians abroad has stopped. On the contrary, in Germany as elsewhere, cases have been reported where protesters were filmed by regime supporters and whose family members who had remained inside Syria were subsequently identified, threatened and arrested (AI, 2011; Gebauer, 2012). Others try to maintain a low profile to protect the chance to see remaining family inside Syria and keep silent out of fear of arrest in case they return (interviews 28 October 2017, 2 October 2018, 25 January 2019, 15 November 2019). To many, political resistance has appeared to become unfeasible, and distrust characterises the atmosphere among Syrian initiatives within Germany for many as they fear that other Syrians might be agents of the regime.

In sum, compared to the high number of Syrians in Germany, few associations of Syrians in Germany have taken up political engagement for peace, and so far, fear and fatigue are among those factors which impede their efforts. Unlike in the Afghan experience, their efforts are centred around Berlin as the current capital rather than Bonn, and their engagement is less characterised by strong linkages to independent

charismatic figures from the pre-war period; rather, the new generation appears to be forming an identity of their own. We thus find a somewhat mixed picture: Those who are willing to engage politically and those who remain “the silent majority”, while on both sides, we find at least five major political currents among Syrians in Germany: 1) those who support the regime, 2) those who tolerate it as they see no alternative, and among the opposition 3) secularists/Leftists, 4) Islam-oriented strands, and 5) the newly emerging generation, whose identity as a ‘group’ is still only emerging.

Ethnically and religiously, all of these groups are diverse. This diversity (religiously and politically) is true also for Syrian Kurds who represent their own case due to their longstanding discrimination by the Syrian regime and their quasi-state of autonomy in northern Syria between 2012 and late 2019. Although Syrian Kurds tend to lean towards a Leftist orientation and often saw themselves as part of the opposition as well, the history of Kurdish resistance inside Syria with the Arab opposition has been a point of contention, which is increasingly reflected among Syrians in Germany as well. From the perspective of many Arab Syrians, the dominating Kurdish group in northern Syria (PYD/YPG) entered a non-attack agreement with the Syrian regime early in the war and fought with the US-International Alliance against the so-called Islamic State (IS), instead of joining active fighting against the regime. Many Arab Syrians have perceived this as a betrayal. In turn, many Syrian Kurdish groups stress they suffered a long history of prosecution and discrimination by the regime, and therefore made it a condition vis-à-vis the Arab opposition groups that they acknowledge minority rights as a matter of priority for forming an alternative political agenda. Politically, Syrian Kurds are divided between those who support the PYD and/or PKK, and those in opposition to PYD/PKK—some of whom identify with Kurdish political parties that form part of the Kurdish National Council (KNC). Further, there are groups that support a “third way” (e.g. Syria’s Tomorrow Movement, Kurdish Future Movement) (Koontz, 2019), and lastly those who distance themselves from Kurdish politics. Formally, only the KNC

has at times had a limited representation in the Geneva peace processes. Despite the PYD's territorial control through YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Turkey has exercised international pressure to exclude it from the peace processes due to its reported PKK links.

As a reflection of these developments, even among those Syrians who identify with the opposition, many worry and try to keep their distance from each other. As the example of Afghanistan shows, however, Afghans in Germany from across a broad political spectrum have remained engaged for decades in peacemaking in Afghanistan and built networks of support in Germany. An open question hence is to what extent the present fatigue among Syrians may give room to the re-emergence of engagement in the longer-term future.

Coexistence of formal peace processes and peacemaking from below

Among both civil opposition groups which did continue to work inside Syria, often in secrecy, before the war and those which emerged since 2011, some have sought to become part of Syrian peace processes. With the war progressing, this has also included newly emerged armed opposition groups. Especially in the first months and years of the war, influential Syrians inside the country as well as abroad launched several broad-based peace initiatives and national dialogue forums. In Germany, the associations who engage in political dialogue for peace mentioned above do not formally form part of formal peace processes. Outside these initiatives, only in very rare cases do individuals from NRW and elsewhere in Germany participate in these processes as individuals. This was the case, for example, in a Syrian-initiated gathering of many opposition groups from inside and outside Syria as well as influential Syrian individuals which took place in May/June 2012 in Antalya, as well as meetings within Syrian opposition groups in Cairo in late 2011/early 2012 (interviews, 23 February 2018, 15 April 2018). While in the early months and years in particular, such initiatives inside Syria and outside were still strongly Syrian-led, this largely changed

when the United Nations intensified its involvement in 2014. Strikingly, prior UN-engagement involved conferences with external states, but with hardly any Syrian participation, as in the case of Geneva I (June 2012) (Hinnebusch & Zartman, 2016). Formal peace processes have mainly occurred in the UN-led Geneva peace processes (cf. Box 3), which have so far entailed eight rounds of negotiations since 2012, and the competing Astana and Sochi talks convened by Russia, Iran and Turkey in 14 rounds since January 2017.⁴³

Syrian-led peace initiatives were weakened by the fact that many had to flee the country to build their lives in different cities around the world, which has further complicated the organic, coherent emergence of oppositional politics. Instead, dozens of small groups with limited membership have emerged especially among the civil opposition. These at times joined larger umbrellas which were subsequently internationally recognised as “the opposition”: The Syrian National Council established in Istanbul, Turkey, in August 2011, the Syrian National Coalition (the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces) founded in Doha, Qatar, in November 2012, the Higher Negotiation Committee created in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2015 and the Syrian Negotiation Commission as its successor since January 2019. In each transition from one umbrella to the next, the former umbrella formally continued to exist, but some members resigned and others were added to form a new umbrella. Many opposition groups, and especially Syria's intellectuals, have kept their distance from these formal processes.

The only official representation of the formally recognised Syrian opposition in Germany are two bodies: The Syrian National Coalition with its Berlin office, since 2015 as part of the Syrian Negotiation Commission, and the Kurdish National Council office also based in Berlin. However, research participants have frequently expressed that they do not see themselves represented by either of these bodies nor in the larger Geneva processes. In some cases, German policy and political foundations have facilitated meetings which were meant to feed into formal peacemaking. For example, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

43 \ The following Box 3 focusses on Geneva because it has been the longer-lasting, more diverse of these processes.

Box 3***The Geneva Peace Processes (Track 1)***

Dates: Eight rounds of meetings since June 2012, ongoing

Participants (Track 1): varying

In eight rounds of meetings, the constellation of participants in the Geneva Peace Processes has varied greatly. Meetings ranged between being held exclusively by heads of foreign states (Geneva 1), to separate, parallel talks between the UN mediation teams and regime and opposition delegations, respectively (except one all shuttle diplomacy; no direct contact) on Track 1.

Where the regime and opposition delegations attended negotiation rounds, it has also changed frequently who constituted the officially, internationally recognised opposition. Currently, it is represented by the Syrian Negotiation Committee (SNC), which is an umbrella group comprising 58 sub-groups (including the so-called, somewhat separate Moscow and Cairo groups, which are seen as comparatively close to the regime). In total, the SNC consists of 134 individual members affiliated with these groups. Practically, although it is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia, individuals affiliated with the SNC live all over the world and have few opportunities to actually meet and discuss their agenda and strategy. Off the SNC, only between 10 to 15 members on average are permitted to be part of the delegation. Lastly, the SNC itself has emerged out of several donor-initiated mergers of previous umbrella groups. Accordingly, the Geneva peace processes are characterised by a lack of continuity and often criticised for the lack of representativeness, transparency and the influences of external donor states.

Organisation: UN office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria (Kofi Annan (February-August 2012), Lakhdar Brahimi (August 2012-May 2014), Staffan de Mistura (May 2014-December 2018), Geir Pederson (December 2018-ongoing).

Proceedings: Depending on military developments in the war, issues discussed have changed with each round, including questions of ceasefires and humanitarian access.

Results: Among its milestones are the Kofi Annan Six Point Plan (March 2012; Syrian-led political process, halt to fighting by all sides, humanitarian access, freedom of movement for journalists, the right to assembly and to demonstrate peacefully); the Geneva Communiqué (June 2012, among others proposing a transitional government); and UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (December 2015; transitional government, constitutional reform, elections within 18 months, war against terrorism). Formally, the latter has resulted in the newly launched Constitutional Committee in place since November 2019. Practically, the military situation so far has not allowed to force compromise on the regime delegation.

(SWP), the institute charged with advising the German government, briefly became a rallying point for some groups within the Syrian opposition, including some based in Germany, when it co-convened “The Day After” project together with the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) in 2012 (SWP & USIP, 2012). With participants from inside and outside of Syria, it sought to offer training by creating working groups on the rule of law, transitional justice, security sector reform, constitution-making, electoral reform and formation of a constitutional assembly, and economic and social policy reform. Yet, the initiative ceased thereafter. During this process, however, other groups who wished to participate were excluded. This concerned for instance Syrian Kurdish groups, despite a long history of voluntary work in NRW, who were not

permitted to join, which, as they assume, may have been due to pressure by the Turkish government not to allow Kurdish individuals to participate (interviews 15 April 2018, 5 October 2019).

Consequently, Syrian political engagement and involvement in peace initiatives in Germany has been severely constrained by a continuous fear of persecution and harm to family members inside Syria. While militarily, the regime has gained the upper hand since the Russian intervention, the UN-mediated peace processes in Geneva have not at any point made significant progress in achieving a political settlement. Many Syrians who fled the country describe how they had felt enormous enthusiasm, relief and hope of a ‘free Syria’ after overcoming the invisible barriers of fear, speaking out for the first time in their

lives, discussing politics openly, experiencing the solidarity of protests, and often feeling as if overcoming decades of state repression. Yet for many, this experience was followed by most painful losses of loved ones, their home, of suffering shelling and hunger and losing all hopes. To many, the United States and other Western states betrayed their alleged ideals of supporting democracy, human rights and civilian protection when chemical weapons attacks (Obama's "red line"), aerial bombardments of forbidden targets in International Humanitarian Law, such as private homes, hospitals, schools and bakeries, mass executions of persons in detention, and the disappearance of more than 90,000 persons by the hands of regime forces. While external states supporting the opposition "demanded" civilian protection, they did nothing to enforce it while Russian and Chinese vetoes have forced a deadlock of the UN Security Council. These developments explain a deep sense of fatigue among Syrians abroad. Political engagement for changing the situation inside Syria to many seems hopeless at a time when the regime appears entrenched. Overall, there is strong sense that military defeat, continued repression and a lack of transitional justice renders peacemaking efforts for Syria neigh on impossible, at least at the present time. Despite widespread frustration with official peace processes, newly emerging Syrian associations have only just begun to encourage Syrians to engage in developing political visions for a future Syria.

Conclusion: A comparison of Afghan and Syrian engagement for peace

Among Syrians, engagement for peacemaking shows a period of initiatives and hope, especially in the early months and years after the beginning of protests. Political orientations were diverse, though, and most Syrians would tend to keep their views to themselves for fear of retaliation if not for themselves, then for loved ones inside the country. It appears that this atmosphere of fear has significantly impeded building wider networks among Syrians in Germany, especially across different parts of the opposition. In some instances, individuals do join Syrian-led political initiatives for peace and in rare cases official talks. Overall, the legacy of the Syrian police state and its reach abroad continues to render the work of existing initiatives that offer forums for dialogue and discussion very difficult. In comparison with Afghan initiatives, significant parallels and differences emerge.

As our historical analysis of Afghan and Syrian immigration into Germany has shown (Chapter 3), both cases comprise different generations of immigration (Afghans: 1978-1992 [first generation], 1993-1995 [second generation], 1996-2001 [third generation], since 2010 [fourth generation]; Syrians: 1960s-1970s [first generation], 1980s-2010 [second generation] and 2011-ongoing [third generation]). Each of these generations is distinct from the others regarding their educational and socio-economic background. Yet strikingly, we find that within each of these generations, politically, they are highly heterogeneous and also conflictual. A point which Afghan and Syrian immigration to Germany share is that those who are the most politically engaged are those who came to Germany shortly after the outbreak of war in 1978 and 2011, respectively. These individuals tend to be young and highly educated, often with a university degree. Equally in both histories, we find that most of their engagement has been carried out in unpaid, voluntary initiatives. Yet with prolonged war or the re-eruption of conflict, political engagement for peace has been followed by severe fatigue. In both cases, we find a striking political disconnect between generations.

In our comparison of their activities on political engagement for peace (Chapter 4), we identified three levels of engagement:

- 1) *grassroots mobilisation*: At the grassroots level, both Afghans and Syrians committed themselves to raising awareness for the wars at home in Germany, for example through rallies, lobbying with German political parties and parliamentarians and to getting involved in initiatives that reach into Afghanistan and Syria, as well as into the community in Germany.
- 2) *privately initiated political engagement for peace*: This has occurred formally organised in associations (*Vereine*) or by individuals on their own. A striking similarity that both share is the development of networks. Although networks among Afghans in Germany appear to be denser, a common characteristic of both is that we do not see the emergence of actual political parties with broad-based memberships or feasible, concrete programmes for peace and political reform inside Afghanistan and Syria, respectively. Notably, this is a phenomenon which is not limited to Germany but applies internationally.
- 3) *rare top-level engagement in formal peace processes*, which, however, seems largely disjoint from levels 1) and 2). Both experiences show that even for persons with a long-standing peacemaking engagement, access to official talks (Track 1) remains absolutely exceptional, and disappointment in these official processes and the lack of representativeness have enhanced frustration. Failures in official talks have meant a setback for non-official peacemaking and growing fatigue. However, in the case of the highly diverse Afghan peacemaking initiatives, these show remarkable resilience, especially in the long-term perspective. Despite this, we regard the noted fatigue-induced shift from a strong political engagement towards more developmental—outright non-political—activities as alarming. We hold that engagement for peace among Afghans and Syrians could make a highly valuable contribution towards developing politically alternative visions for peace in Afghanistan and Syria, respectively.

Beyond these three levels, we note a number of significant differences. First, Afghans who arrived after 1978 looked back at mostly illegal political engagement inside Afghanistan from 1964 onwards, faced threats of persecution from either 1974 or 1978 onwards but continued to be politically engaged in Germany. This included, as we showed, the active recruitment of Afghans in Germany into certain groups, lobbying and protest as well as publishing activities. Among Syrians, political engagement in Germany, in contrast, remains severely impeded by the reach of the Syrian police state and decades of repression before that. Where such initiatives were founded, they are often not connected to long-standing political work inside Syria, contrary to the Afghan case, but indicate the emergence of new political identities. The focus of activities shifted from Bonn—during its time as a capital for the first generation of Afghans who had come since the beginning of the war—to Berlin for Syrian initiatives since 2011. Second, we find exceptional cases of broad-based private initiatives for peace processes among Afghans in Germany, such as the case of Munich—despite the fact that violent conflict in Afghanistan is in its 23rd year. Among Syrians, such a development in Germany has not yet been possible.

This said, the analytical insights of this *Paper* demonstrate that peacemaking agency among Afghans and Syrians is highly varied and significant. However, it has manifested differently. With our approach of reconstructing history from within, we were able to show that peacemaking engagement is much broader than scholarship has so far acknowledged. Many of the initiatives we were able to document feature remarkable efforts, in which individuals invested year- and decades-long voluntary engagement in and networking for peacemaking. In some cases, this has generated formats with broad mobilisation and backing among conflict parties such as the Munich Conference in August 2001. However, these processes have neither been acknowledged by international foreign policymakers, nor have their results been integrated into official talks.

Nonetheless, we also find three major structural constraints to such engagement for peace, which stem from both international and German politics. First, activists of the initiatives we have learned about in the course of the research process have been denied access to formal peace processes, in some cases without further explanation. Indeed, no transparent guidelines or criteria exist for who is included or excluded in official negotiations. This is problematic because in both cases we know of people with relevant constituencies that are deprived of participation. Second, the political environment in the country of origin, including ongoing war, and challenges in connecting peacemaking efforts inside the respective country with those abroad impede the emergence of broad-based alternative political visions. Third, the strong dominance of international interests renders peacemaking on Track 1 highly selective and elitist despite official claims to inclusivity.

Based on our finding that most Afghan and Syrian initiatives originate as private and voluntary work, we argue that domestic politics in Germany have limited Afghans' and Syrians' peacemaking agency in the past. For the present, we note that funding for political engagement for peace still largely remains lacking. Current funding regulations prioritise specific issues, such as language classes for refugees, capacity-building for skills to integrate into the German labour market, etc. Where engagement aims for change inside Afghanistan and Syria, it is bound by funding available either for humanitarian aid or development activities such as infrastructure (re)building or to cover basic needs (education and health). In line with development and foreign policy imperatives, individuals and particular groups of foreign countries of origin have been instrumentalised as seemingly unpolitical development actors by German politicians, agencies and foreign policy.

Taking these insights further, we argue that a fundamental part of peacemaking is to foster the ability to develop alternative paths for the future based on informed worldviews and critical thinking. This would enable Afghans and Syrians to engage in a

range of activities, such as political education projects which may in the long-term inform the development of political programmes for the country of origin and initiate reforms in constitutive fields (security sector, transitional justice, economics, etc.). In the long term, such support will enable more individuals to become competent proponents in peace processes. Strikingly, throughout both a forty-year-old history of Afghan wars and an eight-year Syrian war, the importance of supporting independent critical thought, which should organically grow out of Afghan and Syrian initiatives has still not been recognised, addressed or supported by international or German federal or state-level policy. Accordingly, as our analysis has shown, we currently find very few such initiatives despite a high potential visible in voluntary work and the commitment of volunteers. Consequently, this research reveals that support towards enabling autonomous political education from among Afghans and Syrians who live in Germany, which is meaningful to their respective communities is lacking, although it is crucial. So we propose that support for informal and private initiatives for peace should also be supported in creating dedicated space for exchange and interaction among each other, and in cases where these are based on significant constituencies either abroad or within the country, these should also be integrated into official peace processes in a transparent and systematic manner if they so wish.

For future research, this *Paper* proposes that politically varied orientations among Afghans and Syrians as well as their engagement for peace abroad deserve significantly more attention. This applies equally to communities from other countries at war. On a micro- and meso-level, peace processes entail a much wider range of activities—including privately initiated processes—that current history writing with its focus on official peace processes suggests. Especially among communities with large numbers of individuals living abroad, political engagement for peace could develop significant traction in creating alternative, diverse political visions for future peace.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AFD</i>	Alternative für Deutschland (right-wing German opposition party)	<i>AFD</i>
<i>BICC</i>	Bonn International Center for Conversion	<i>BICC</i>
<i>CDU</i>	Christian Democratic Union (German political party)	<i>CDU</i>
<i>CPSU</i>	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	<i>CPSU</i>
<i>DISASPEACE</i>	Diasporas for Peace	<i>DISASPEACE</i>
<i>FAZA</i>	Federation of Afghans and Afghan Students	<i>FAZA</i>
<i>GDR</i>	German Democratic Republic	<i>GDR</i>
<i>GoA</i>	Government of Afghanistan	<i>GoA</i>
<i>GUAfs</i>	General Union of Afghan Students Abroad	<i>GUAfs</i>
<i>HIG</i>	Hezb-e Islami faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar	<i>HIG</i>
<i>JU</i>	Junge Union (youth branch of the German Christian Democratic Party)	<i>JU</i>
<i>KNC</i>	Kurdish National Council	<i>KNC</i>
<i>KUPFA</i>	Komitee zur Unterstützung der politischen Flüchtlinge in Afghanistan (Committee for the support of political refugees in Afghanistan)	<i>KUPFA</i>
<i>LCC</i>	Civilian local coordination committee (Syrians in Germany)	<i>LCC</i>
<i>NEFA</i>	National Unity Front of Afghanistan	<i>NEFA</i>
<i>NGO</i>	Non-government organisation	<i>NGO</i>
<i>NRW</i>	North Rhine-Westphalia	<i>NRW</i>
<i>OECD</i>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	<i>OECD</i>
<i>OSULA</i>	Organisation for Strengthening of Unity and Struggle for the Liberation of Afghanistan	<i>OSULA</i>
<i>PDPA</i>	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan	<i>PDPA</i>
<i>PKK</i>	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers' Party	<i>PKK</i>
<i>PYD</i>	Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party	<i>PYD</i>
<i>SAMA</i>	Organization for the liberation of the people of Afghanistan	<i>SAMA</i>
<i>SNC</i>	Syrian Negotiation Commission	<i>SNC</i>
<i>UNSMA</i>	United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan	<i>UNSMA</i>
<i>YPG</i>	Yekineyen Parastina Gel, (People's Protection Units)	<i>YPG</i>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “Es stimmt, daß ich eine Avantgarde repräsentiere”: Eine afghanische Feministin (1982, 28 January). *TAZ*.
- “Grausame Unterdrücker”: Afghanistans Ex-Präsident al-Mojaddedi gibt Pakistan die Schuld am Bürgerkrieg und fordert die Taliban auf, die vier Deutschen freizulassen (2001, 28 August). *FOCUS*.
- Afghan factions urged to hold direct talks (2001, 28 August). *Pakistan Observer*.
- Afghan factions urged to hold talks (2001, 28 August). *Frontier Post*.
- An interview with Dr Muhammad Yousuf (1994). *The Writers Union of Free Afghanistan* (WUFA), 1(1), 7-10.
- Munich meeting for direct Afghan talks: Rabbani shows readiness to share power with Taliban (2001, 28 August). *The News*.
- Abboud, S. N. (2016). *Syria*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Abd-Allah, U. F. (1983). *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*. Berkeley Mizan Press.
- Adamec, L. W. (2006). *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan* (Third Edition). New Delhi: Manas Publications in collaboration with Scarecrow Press, Inc.
- Amnesty International. (2011). *The long Reach of the Mukhabarat: Violence and Harassment against Syrians abroad and their Relatives back home* (Report). London: Amnesty International. Retrieved 9 November 2019 from <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/32000/mde240572011en.pdf>
- Amnesty International. (2015). *Between Prison and the Grave. Enforced Disappearances in Syria* (Report). London: AI. Retrieved 7 May 2018 from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/2579/2015/en/>
- Amnesty International. (2016). *“It breaks the Human.” Torture, Disease and Death in Syria’s Prisons* (Report). London: AI. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2445082016ENGLISH.PDF>
- Baraulina, T., Bommers, M., El-Cherkeh, T., Daume, H., & Vadean, F. (2007). *Ägyptische, afghanische und serbische Diasporagemeinden in Deutschland und ihre Beiträge zur Entwicklung ihrer Herkunftsländer* (HWWI Research Paper 3-5). Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
- Baser, B., & Swain, A. (2008). Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts. *International Journal on World Peace*, 25(3), 7-28. DOI: 10.2307/20752844
- Baser, B., & Toivanen, M. (2018). Diasporas building peace: Reflections from the experience of Middle Eastern diasporas. In R. Cohen & C. Fischer (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies* (pp. 345-353). London and New York: Routledge.
- Batatu, H. (1982). Syria’s Muslim Brethren. In Middle East Research and Information Project (Ed.), *MERIP Reports*, 12(9), 12-20; 34. DOI: 10.2307/3012279
- Behrendt, M. (2002, 21 September). Ferien in der Heimat: Exil-Afghanen in Deutschland setzen sich für den Wiederaufbau ihres Landes ein - aber nur wenige wollen zurück nach Afghanistan. *Der Spiegel*, 39.
- Bercovitch, J. (2007). A neglected relationship: Diasporas and conflict resolution. In H. Smith & P. Stares (Eds.), *Diasporas in conflict: Peace-makers or peace-wreckers* (pp. 17-38). Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press.
- Bindemann, R. (1994, Juli). Die afghanischen Studenten in Ostdeutschland und die Folgen der Wiedervereinigung. *Afghanistan Info*, 20-21.
- Braakman, M. (2005). *Roots and Routes: Questions of Home, Belonging and Return in an Afghan Diaspora* (Master’s thesis, Leiden University, Netherlands). Retrieved from http://ag-afghanistan.de/files/braakman_roots_a_routes.pdf
- Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(1), 1-19. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997>
- Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. (1985). *BV Berlin, Abteilung II 586*, 28. Oktober 1985. Berlin: BStU MfS.
- Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. (1987). *HAI Nr. 18216 Teil 1 von 2 Ausbildung ausländischer Militärkader in der NVA (26. Oktober 1987)* (NVA = Nationale Volksarmee). Berlin: BStU MfS.
- Council for At-Risk-Academics. (2019). *The State of Higher Education in Syria Pre-2011*. Cambridge: CARA. Retrieved 5 November 2019 from https://www.cara.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/190606-BC_SYRIA-REPORT-ENGLISH_HR.pdf
- Centlivres-Demont, M. (2001). Die afghanische Diaspora in Europa. In Evangelische Akademie Iserlohn im IKG (Ed.), *IKG Tagungsprotokolle, Afghanen im Exil: Identität und politische Verantwortung. Tagung der Evangelischen Akademie Iserlohn im Institut für Kirche und Gesellschaft der EKvW 15.-17. Dezember 2000* (pp. 37-50). Iserlohn: Institut für Kirche und Gesellschaft (IKG).
- Cohen, R., & Fischer, C. (Eds.). (2019). *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000). *Greed and Grievance* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355). Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/359271468739530199/pdf/multi-page.pdf>.
- Convergne, E. (2016). UN Mediators’ Collaboration with Scholars and Expert NGOs: Explaining the Need for Knowledge-Based Communities in Today’s Conflicts. *International Negotiation*, 21, 135-164. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341327>
- Daxner, M., & Nicola, S.-L. (2017). *Mapping of and report on the Afghan Diaspora in Germany*. Eschborn.
- Delano Alonso, A., & Mylonas, H. (2019). The microfoundations of diaspora politics: Unpacking the state and disaggregating the diaspora. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(4), 473-491. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1409160>
- Dufoix, S. (2008). *Diasporas*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Elias, N. (1978). *What is sociology?* New York: Columbia University Press.
- El Mogaddedi, O. (2001). Das Engagement der Afghanen für Afghanistan. In Evangelische Akademie Iserlohn im IKG (Ed.), *IKG Tagungsprotokolle, Afghanen im Exil: Identität und politische Verantwortung. Tagung der Evangelischen Akademie Iserlohn im Institut für Kirche und Gesellschaft der EKvW 15.-17. Dezember 2000* (pp. 99-107). Iserlohn: Institut für Kirche und Gesellschaft (IKG).
- Fenzel, M. R. (2017). *No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Feron, E. Diasporas and Conflicts: Dangerous Liaisons? In T. Martkainen (Ed.), *Siirtolaisuus-Migratio*, Vol. 44, 13-15. Retrieved from http://www.migrationinstitute.fi/files/pdf/siirtolaisuus-migration/sm_1_2018.pdf
- Feron, E., & Lefort, B. (2019). Diasporas and conflicts: Understanding the nexus. *Diaspora Studies*, 12(1), 34-51. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09739572.2018.1538687>
- Fischer, C. (2018). Reframing transnational engagement: a relational analysis of Afghan diasporic groups. *Global Networks*, 18(3), 399-417. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12186>
- Fischer, C., & Dahinden, J. (2019). Using pragmatism to approach ‘diaspora’, its meanings and political implications. In R. Cohen & C. Fischer (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies* (pp. 293-301). London and New York: Routledge.
- Gamlén, A. (2019). Why engage diasporas? In R. Cohen & C. Fischer (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies* (pp. 303-310). London and New York: Routledge.
- Gebauer, M. (2012). Der lange Arm des Assad-Regimes. *Der Spiegel*, Retrieved 25 March 2013, from <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/syrische-agenten-in-berlin-der-lange-arm-des-assad-regimes-a-813918.html>
- George, A. (2003). *Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom*. London: Zed Books.

- Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. (2019). *Programme Migration & Diaspora: Leveraging potential - promoting development*. Eschborn: GIZ. Retrieved from <https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2019-en-programme-migration-global.pdf>
- Grevmeyer, J.-H., & Maiwand-Grevmeyer, T. (1988). *Afghanistan: Presse und Widerstand. Occasional Papers*, 14. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.
- Hinnebusch, R., & Zartman, I. W. (2016, March). *UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi*. New York: International Peace Institute. Retrieved 24 April 2019, from <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/IPI-Rpt-Syrian-Crisis2.pdf>
- Horst, C. (2013). The Depoliticisation of Diasporas form the Horn of Africa: From Refugees to Transnational Aid Workers. *African Studies*, 72(2), 228-245.
- Human Rights Watch. (2011). *"We Live as in War": Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs* (Report). New York: HRW. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/11/11/we-live-war/crackdown-protesters-governorate-homs-syria>
- Human Rights Watch. (2013). *"You Can Still See Their Blood". Executions, Indiscriminate Shootings, and Hostage Taking by Opposition Forces in Latakia Countryside* (Report). New York: HRW. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1013_ForUpload.pdf
- Ismail, S. (2018). *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jahn, T. C. B. (2019). Responding Responsibly: West Germany's Relations with the Mujahideen During the Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-1987. *International History Review*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1647869>
- Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kent, G. (2006). Organised diaspora networks and homeland peacebuilding: The Bosnian world diaspora network as a potential development actor. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 6(3), 449-469. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933639>
- Khoury, D. (2013). *Losing the Syrian Grassroots Local Governance Structures Urgently Need Support* (SWP Comments). Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Retrieved 26 May 2014 from https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C09_kou.pdf
- Koinova, M. (2011). Diasporas and secessionist conflicts: The mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen diasporas. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(2), 333-356. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.489646>
- Koinova, M. (2011). Can Conflict-generated Diasporas be Moderate Actors during Episodes of Contested Sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian Diasporas Compared. *Review of International Studies*, 37(1), 437-462. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000252>
- Koinova, M. (2017). Critical junctures and transformative events in diaspora mobilisation for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1(20). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354158>
- Koinova, M. (2018). Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: Contextual and comparative dimensions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(8), 1251-1269. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354152>
- Kreutz, J. (2010). How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(2), 243-250. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353108>
- Komitee zur Unterstützung der politischen Flüchtlinge in Afghanistan. (1987). *KUPFA Rechenschaftsbericht. Afghanistan Blätter* (p. 17). Hamburg KUPFA.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: USIP.
- Lund, A. (2012). *Divided they Stand* (Report). Uppsala: Foundation for European Progressive Studies & Olof Palme International Center. Retrieved 6 October 2018 from <https://www.palmecenter.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Divided-they-stand-2012.pdf>
- Mason, T. D., & Fett, P. J. (1996). How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(4), 546-568. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/174457>
- Mediendienst Integration. (2019). Syrische Flüchtlinge. Retrieved 21 September 2019 from <https://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/flucht-asyl/syrische-fluechtlinge.html>
- Meininghaus, E. (n.d.). Reflections: Why we need Anthropological Approaches to Peace Processes. [Under Review].
- Milner, J. (2011). *Refugees and the peacebuilding process* (Research Paper No. 224). Geneva: UNHCR.
- Neumann, V. (1987). *Eine Bestandsaufnahme. Afghanistan Blätter* (p. 7). Berlin: KUPFA.
- Orywal, E. (1993, Mai). Afghanen in Deutschland: Eine statistische Notiz zur Migrationssituation. *Afghanistan Info* (pp. 17-19).
- Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. (2006). *Diasporas and Conflict Resolution: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?* (DIIS Brief). Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Paffenholz, T. (2014). *Broadening participation in peace processes*. Lausanne: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Retrieved from <http://www.hd-centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/MPS4-Broadening-participation-in-peace-processes-July-2014.pdf>
- Penter, T., & Meier, E. (Eds.). (2017). *Sovietnam: Die UdSSR in Afghanistan 1979-1989*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
- Perthes, V. (1995). *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Pohly, M. (1992). *Krieg und Widerstand in Afghanistan: Ursachen, Verlauf und Folgen seit 1978*. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.
- Peace Research Institute Oslo. (2008-11). *Diasporas for Peace (DIASPEACE)*. Oslo: PRIO. Retrieved from <https://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1407>
- Ragab, N. J., & Katbeh, A. (2017). *Syrian Diaspora Groups in Europe: Mapping their Engagement in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom*. Copenhagen, Maastricht: Danish Refugee Council, Maastricht University, United Nations University. Retrieved 26 November 2018 from https://drc.ngo/media/4167496/drc-diaspora-programme_study_syrian-diaspora-groups-in-europe_web.pdf
- Reber, F., & Schmeidl, S. (2001, 21 Februar). Die Stimmen der afghanischen Zivilgesellschaft: Das Afghan Civil Society Meeting als Hoffnungsträger. *Afghanistan Info*, 15-16.
- Rennesse, E.-A. v. (2016). Freundschaft verpflichtet: Hundert Jahre deutsch-afghanische Beziehungen. In *Ausgewählte Beiträge der XXIX. Villigster Afghanistan-Tagung* (pp. 2-17). Schwerte: Evangelische Akademie Villigst. Retrieved from http://www.kircheundgesellschaft.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Das_Institut/Newsletter_09_2016/Dokumentation_AFG.pdf
- Röing, T. (2019). *Continuation of political conflicts or a new beginning? Turkish refugees in North Rhine-Westphalia* (BICC Working Paper series No. 6/2019). Bonn: BICC. Retrieved from https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/BICC_Working_Paper_6_2019_e_01.pdf
- Rubin, B. R. (1989). Afghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State. *Journal of Political Science*, 18, 63-93.
- Ruttig, T. (2006). *Islamists, Leftists - and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan's Political parties and where they come from (1902-2006)*. Kabul/Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
- Ruttig, T. (2010). Aus Bündnistreue zur Sowjetunion: Eine kurze Suche nach der DDR-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Afghanistan und den Spuren, die sie hinterlassen hat. In T. Kunze & T. Vogel (Eds.), *Ostalgie international: Erinnerungen an die DDR von Nicaragua bis Vietnam* (pp. 127-138). Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag.

- Rzehak, L. (2002, Februar). Die zweite Generation afghanischer Einwanderer meldet sich zu Wort. *Afghanistan Info*.
- Saleh, Y. al-H. (2017). *The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Schmeidl, S. (2002). Afghan Civil Society Meeting in Bad Honnef (Germany) 30th November - 2nd December 2001: Internal (Confidential) Report. Bern: swisspeace.
- Scholl-Latour, P. (1985). *Allah ist mit den Standhaften. Begegnungen mit der islamischen Revolution*. Berlin.
- Seale, P. (1990). *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Syrian Network for Human Rights. (2019). *At least 98,000 Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Syria since March 2011* (Report).
- Sökefeld, M. (2006). Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora. *Global Networks*, 6(3), 265-284. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00144>.
- Stroux, Salina (2002) "Afghanische Teppichhändler in der Hamburger Speicherstadt," *Ethnoscripts: Analysen und Informationen aus dem Institut Für Ethnologie der Universität Hamburg* 4(1): 3-18.
- Swisspeace (2001, December 2). Civil society conference for peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, Bad Honnef (Bonn), 29 Nov to 2 Dec: Final Press Information [Press release].
- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, & United States Institute of Peace. *The Day After. Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria. Vision, Principles, Objectives, Challenges, and Recommendations*. (SWP Comments 28). Bonn, Washington, DC: SWP & USIP. Retrieved December 10, 2018, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C28_TDA.pdf
- Todenhöfer, J. (1989). *Ich denke Deutsch. Abrechnung mit dem Zeitgeist*. Erlangen
- Trentin, M. (2009). Modernization as State Building: The Two Germanies in Syria, 1963-1972. *Diplomatic History*, 33(3), 487-505. Oxford University Press.
- United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council. (2017). UNGA A/HRC/34/64. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF-CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_34_64.pdf
- Van Hear, N., & Cohen, R. (2016). Diasporas and Conflict: Distance, Contiguity and Spheres of Engagement. *Oxford Development Studies*, 45(2), 171-184. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2016.1160043>
- Vertovec, S. (2005). *The Political Importance of Diasporas*. Oxford.
- Warnecke, A. (2010). *Diasporas and Peace: A Comparative Assessment of Somali and Ethiopian Communities in Europe*. (BICC brief 42). Bonn: BICC.
- Wedeer, L. (2015). *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Yassin-Kassab, R., & Al-Shami, L. (2016). *Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution*. London: Pluto Press.
- Zartman, I. W. (Ed.). (1995). *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Zunzer, W. (2004). *Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation* (Berghof Occasional Paper No. 26). Berlin: Berghof Foundation.

bicc \
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH

Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de

www.bicc.de
www.facebook.com/bicc.de

bicc Bonn
International Center
for Conversion \

Director for Research
Professor Dr Conrad Schetter

Director for Administration
Michael Dedek

AUTHORS

Dr Esther Meininghaus, Senior Researcher, BICC
Dr Katja Mielke, Senior Researcher, BICC

COPYEDITOR
Heike Webb

DATE OF PUBLICATION
04 December 2019

EDITORIAL DESIGN
Diesseits - Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf



Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under:
[cf. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)